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Officer Kay Oss of the Midgard State Police received a
report from a guidance counselor that a fourteen-year-old
girl, Stacy, disclosed she was sexually abused by a fortythree-year-old man named John. Stacy told Officer Oss
that John physically harmed her and took sexually explicit
photos of her with his cell phone. Officer Oss is
investigating John for various offenses he committed
against Stacy. To support her investigation, Officer Oss
wishes to obtain information from the cloud-based storage
provider used by John, but she is uncertain whether she
may obtain this information with a Midgard search warrant,
as the servers used by the provider are located in Virginia.
I. INTRODUCTION
Digital evidence exists in almost every criminal case and provides
unparalleled corroborative utility, particularly for crimes often committed
in secret, such as child exploitation. This evidence is increasingly stored
remotely on servers across state lines, around the globe, and beyond. 6 It is
therefore critical for prosecutors and law enforcement to develop an
understanding of the pertinent domestic and international legal
considerations for obtaining remotely stored data.
This Article provides an overview of the Stored Communications
Act (SCA), the trajectory of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence since the
SCA’s passage, relevant provisions of the Clarifying Lawful Overseas Use of
Data (CLOUD) Act, and bilateral agreements following the enactment of
the CLOUD Act. This Article uses real-life scenarios that prosecutors and
law enforcement face to explore the potential pitfalls of accessing remotely
stored data and proposes possible solutions to those problems. Examples
include practices for obtaining domestically stored data, obtaining
internationally stored data via the CLOUD Act agreement or mutual legal
assistance treaty (MLAT), obtaining internationally stored data in the
absence of the CLOUD Act agreements or MLATs, and obtaining data
stored in extraterrestrial locations.

Industry forecasters predict significant annual growth rates and increasing global cloud
service revenue. See Louis Columbus, Public Cloud Soaring to $331B by 2022 According
to
Gartner,
FORBES
(Apr.
7,
2019),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/louiscolumbus/2019/04/07/public-cloud-soaring-to-331b-by2022-according-to-gartner/?sh=7b4726665739 [https://perma.cc/B526-2JU3]; see also infra
Section V.F.
6
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II. THE STORED COMMUNICATIONS ACT
AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT

A.

The Stored Communications Act

The SCA “creates a set of Fourth Amendment-like privacy
protections by statute, regulating the relationship between government
investigators and service providers in possession of users’ private
information.” 7 Notably, Congress enacted the SCA in 1986, before many of
today’s predominant technologies even existed. 8 Disposable cameras were
new arrivals to mainstream culture, 9 but the World Wide Web 10 and
Nintendo Game Boy 11 would not debut for another three years. Given this
cultural and technological context, it is unsurprising that the SCA’s
provisions are often difficult for courts to reconcile with modern technology
such as cloud-based data storage and complex anonymization platforms.
The SCA applies when law enforcement requests records or data
about a customer from a communications service provider, rather than
obtaining the same records from the customer’s own computer or device. 12
Prior to the enactment of the SCA, the third-party doctrine enabled law
enforcement to obtain this data without violating the Fourth Amendment.
The United States Supreme Court created the third-party
doctrine in the cases of Smith 13 and Miller. 14 The doctrine states that a
person who voluntarily provides information to a third party relinquishes
any reasonable expectation of privacy in that information, thus eliminating
Fourth Amendment protection on that data. 15 In Smith, the Court
concluded that because the defendant voluntarily released dialed
information to the telephone company and assumed the risk that such
information could be revealed to the police, the defendant had no
reasonable expectation of privacy in the numbers dialed from his
Rudolph J. Burshnic, Applying the Stored Communications Act to the Civil Discovery of
Social Networking Sites, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1259, 1261–62 (2012) (quoting Orin S.
Kerr, A User’s Guide to the Stored Communications Act, and a Legislator’s Guide to
Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1208, 1212 (2004)).
Id. at 1261.
Ernie Smith, Point, Shoot, and Forget, TEDIUM (July 26, 2018),
7

8
9

https://tedium.co/2018/07/26/disposable-camera-history/ [https://perma.cc/F8C2-MWAE].
History
of
the
Web,
WORLD
WIDE
WEB
FOUND.,
https://webfoundation.org/about/vision/history-of-the-web/ [https://perma.cc/8EZ5-5DL4].
Game
Boy,
NAT’L
MUSEUM
AM.
HIST.,
https://americanhistory.si.edu/collections/search/object/nmah_1253117
[https://perma.cc/5TZ7-ZYUL].
Burshnic, supra note 9, at 1262.
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
Id. at 443.
10

11

12
13
14
15
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telephone. 16 In Miller, the Court held that the defendant’s bank records,
which showed the existence of the defendant’s illegal whiskey enterprise,
were voluntarily disclosed to the bank when the defendant made
purchases. 17 Because these records were voluntarily disclosed, the defendant
16

Smith, 442 U.S. at 745.

On March 5, 1976, in Baltimore, Md., Patricia McDonough was
robbed. She gave the police a description of the robber and of a 1975
Monte Carlo automobile she had observed near the scene of the crime.
. . . On March 16, police spotted a man who met McDonough’s
description driving a 1975 Monte Carlo in her neighborhood. By tracing
the license plate number, police learned that the car was registered in
the name of petitioner, Michael Lee Smith.
The next day, the telephone company, at police request, installed a pen
register at its central offices to record the numbers dialed from the
telephone at petitioner’s home. The police did not get a warrant or court
order before having the pen register installed. The register revealed that
on March 17 a call was placed from petitioner's home to McDonough’s
phone. On the basis of this and other evidence, the police obtained a
warrant to search petitioner's residence. . . .
Petitioner was indicted in the Criminal Court of Baltimore for robbery.
By pretrial motion, he sought to suppress “all fruits derived from the
pen register” on the ground that the police had failed to secure a warrant
prior to its installation. The trial court denied the suppression motion,
holding that the warrantless installation of the pen register did not violate
the Fourth Amendment.
Id. at 737–38 (internal citations omitted).
Miller, 425 U.S. at 446.
On December 18, 1972, in response to an informant’s tip, a deputy
sheriff from Houston County, Ga., stopped a van-type truck occupied
by two of respondent’s alleged co-conspirators. The truck contained
distillery apparatus and raw material. On January 9, 1973, a fire broke
out in a . . . warehouse rented to respondent. During the blaze firemen
and sheriff department officials discovered a 7,500-gallon-capacity
distillery, 175 gallons of non-tax-paid whiskey, and related
paraphernalia.
. . . [A]gents from the Treasury Department’s Alcohol, Tobacco and
Firearms Bureau presented grand jury subpoenas issued in blank by the
clerk of the District Court, and completed by the United States
Attorney’s office, to the presidents of the [two banks], where respondent
maintained accounts. The subpoenas required the two presidents to
appear on January 24, 1973, and to produce
“all records of accounts, i.e., savings, checking, loan
or otherwise . . . .”
The banks did not advise respondent that the subpoenas had been
served but ordered their employees to make the records available and
to provide copies of any documents the agents desired.
Id. at 437–38 (internal citations omitted).
Respondent was convicted of possessing an unregistered still, carrying
on the business of a distiller without giving bond and with intent to
defraud the Government of whiskey tax, possessing 175 gallons of
17

2021]

NOT AN OCEAN AWAY, ONLY A MOMENT AWAY

1077

did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy to them. 18 In recent years,
the Court ruled that the third-party doctrine fails to justify government
access to electronic communications made by a cell phone user and
recorded by a cell phone provider under the Fourth Amendment. 19
The SCA protects private customer data by creating different legal
process levels based on the type of data sought by a government entity,
which addresses Fourth Amendment privacy issues caused by the thirdparty doctrine. 20 The Act creates three categories of data: subscriber data
(account holder name and address); transactional data (connectivity to
account data); and content data (open and closed emails, group
membership). 21 The SCA designated both subscribers and transactional
data as non-content. 22 The three legal process levels created by the SCA
correspond with the type of data being requested; more appreciable data
requires a higher legal process. 23
Law enforcement may obtain subscriber data with a subpoena from
a court of competent jurisdiction. 24 Data in this category includes basic
subscriber information related to the customer’s identity, the customer’s
relationship with the service provider, payment method, and basic
connection records. 25 Transactional data includes information such as
whiskey upon which no taxes had been paid, and conspiring to defraud
the United States of tax revenues. Prior to trial respondent moved to
suppress copies of checks and other bank records obtained by means of
allegedly defective subpoenas Duces tecum served upon two banks at
which he had accounts. . . .
The District Court overruled respondent’s motion to suppress, and the
evidence was admitted.
Id. at 436–37 (internal citations omitted).
Id. at 446 (“[W]e hold that respondent lacks the requisite Fourth Amendment interest to
challenge the validity of the subpoenas.”).
See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012); see also Carpenter v. United States, 138
S. Ct. 2206 (2018); Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 403 (2014) (allowing the government
access to cell-site records, which “hold for many Americans ‘the privacies of life,’” and
contravenes any reasonable expectation of privacy in a person’s physical movements).
Burshnic, supra note 9, at 1262–63.
DAVID W. HAGY, NAT’L INST. OF JUST., DIGITAL EVIDENCE IN THE COURTROOM: A
GUIDE FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT AND PROSECUTORS 3 (2007).
18

19

20
21

22
23
24
25

Id.
Id.
Id. at 4.
Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (2018).

A provider of electronic communication service or remote computing
service shall disclose to a governmental entity the—
(A) name;
(B) address;
(C) local and long distance telephone connection records, or
records of session times and durations;
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account activity logs, email addresses of the customer’s correspondents, and
friends lists; law enforcement may obtain this information with a court order
under 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) of the SCA. 26 This document is often referred
to as a 2703(d) order, or a specific and articulable facts order. 27 This order
may be issued by a federal magistrate or a district court with jurisdiction over
the offense under investigation; state court judges authorized by state law
may also issue 2703(d) orders. 28 The application for a 2703(d) order must
provide “specific and articulable facts showing that there are reasonable
grounds to believe that . . . the records or other information sought, are
relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation.” 29 Finally, content
data must be obtained with a search warrant based upon probable cause. 30
Data at this level includes everything in the account not considered either
subscriber or transactional data, such as unopened communications
(unread text messages or emails). 31 Recently, case law added cell site location
information (CSLI) to the category of content data requiring a warrant for
law enforcement access. 32

B.

Problems with the Stored Communications Act

As noted above, the SCA was enacted in an era without the
advanced technology we know today. The SCA’s drafters could not have
anticipated the development of robust technology like the smartphone,
which, as Justice Roberts noted in Carpenter v. United States, is now “almost
a ‘feature of human anatomy.’” 33 In this same vein, it is unlikely the SCA
drafters could have predicted the global environment of data storage—and
(D) length of service (including start date) and types of service
utilized;
(E) telephone or instrument number or other subscriber
number or identity, including any temporarily assigned
network address; and
(F) means and source of payment for such service (including
any credit card or bank account number),
of a subscriber to or customer of such service when the governmental
entity uses an administrative subpoena authorized by a Federal or State
statute or a Federal or State grand jury or trial subpoena or any means
available under [18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(1) (2018)].
Id. § 2703(c)(2).
See HAGY, supra note 23, at 4.
26
27
28
29
30
31
32

See id.

18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2018).

Id.

HAGY, supra note 23, at 6.
Id.
Id.; see also Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2223 (2018) (holding that historical

CSLI must be obtained with a search warrant rather than a § 2703(d) order).
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2218 (quoting Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 385 (2014)).

33
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the jurisdictional issues that arise from that extensive system. Initially, the
SCA only regulated data held within the territorial boundaries of the United
States. The SCA created authority for law enforcement from one state to
use the legal process to obtain stored communications on servers in a
different state under a long-arm jurisdiction theory. With the exponential
growth in technology use and data storage, many of today’s communication
companies stretch outside the United States. 34 For example, a United States
communications company based in Washington state may host data on
servers worldwide to meet international users’ needs and data storage space
requirements. Before amendment by the CLOUD Act, the SCA was silent
regarding a US-based law enforcement officer’s ability to access the same
data on the company’s server abroad.
Domestication of legal process was one of the jurisdictional
difficulties the SCA sought to remedy. Before the SCA existed, local laws
often mandated law enforcement to domesticate the legal process in either
the company’s state of incorporation or the state the data resided in. This
arduous process often required the out-of-state law enforcement official to
communicate with a local law enforcement agency. The out-of-state law
enforcement officer would have to fill out an affidavit for the particular
account or data sought and send the request to the local agency. The local
agency then filled out the actual legal process and submitted it to the
company. The company then responded with the relevant data to the local
law enforcement agency, which had to forward it back to the out-of-state
agency making the original request. The entire process embodied the ageold adage of a game of telephone.
Unfortunately, in trying to remedy the domestication issue, the
SCA created an entirely different jurisdictional problem. Although the SCA
is a federal statute, it relies on both the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
for federal cases and the state level judicial process authorizing subpoenas,
2703(d) orders, and search warrants in state cases. 35 The SCA empowers a
court of competent jurisdiction to issue a subpoena, court order, or a search
warrant for the search and seizure of any information delineated in the Act. 36
A court of competent jurisdiction may be either a federal or state court,
provided the court has jurisdiction over the offense. 37 The jurisdictional
component of the SCA is broad to provide for the availability of multiple
courts to issue warrants under the SCA. 38
U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., PROMOTING PUBLIC SAFETY, PRIVACY, AND THE RULE OF LAW
AROUND THE WORLD: THE PURPOSE AND IMPACT OF THE CLOUD ACT 10 (2019)
[hereinafter THE PURPOSE AND IMPACT OF THE CLOUD ACT].
18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(1)(A) (2018).
Id. § 2703(d).
34

35
36
37
38

Id.
Id. In a federal context, a “court of competent jurisdiction” is defined in relevant part as:
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The SCA’s specific jurisdictional issue emerges when a state judge
issues legal process under the auspices of the SCA’s authority for digital data
stored outside of the territorial boundary of the issuing state. Importantly, a
court of competent jurisdiction includes “a court of general criminal
jurisdiction of a State authorized by the law of that State to issue search
warrants.” 39 As noted in the legislative history for the initial enactment of the
SCA and its subsequent amendments via the PATRIOT Act, Congress
intended the authority granted by the SCA to issue warrants for stored
communications to be broad in application to accommodate expanding
technologies. 40 One court acknowledged that the general authority of a state
court to issue warrants is sufficient; specific authority to issue warrants in
cases of stored communications is not required. 41 A prior version of §
2703(a) stated:

(A) any district court of the United States (including a magistrate judge
of such a court) or any United States court of appeals that—
(i) has jurisdiction over the offense being investigated; [or]
(ii) is in or for a district in which the provider of a wire or
electronic communication service is located or in which the
wire or electronic communications, records, or other
information are stored; or
(iii) is acting on a request for foreign assistance.
Id. § 2711(3)(A)(i)–(iii). The last jurisdictional provision, whereby a federal judge may issue
a warrant when acting on a request for foreign assistance, is distinct from authority granted
by the CLOUD Act. This jurisdictional provision specifically refers to 18 U.S.C. § 3512
(2018), which grants federal judges authority to respond to: foreign requests for assistance in
criminal investigations and prosecutions by issuing search warrants; issue warrants under §
2703 for stored wire or electronic communications; file orders for pen registers or trap and
trace devices; or serve subpoenas for testimony or production of documents. 18 U.S.C. §
3512 (2018). The provision in § 2711(3)(A)(iii) clarifies that a court acting with jurisdictional
authority under § 3512 is also considered to be a court of competent jurisdiction for purposes
of issuing warrants, subpoenas, and orders under the SCA. This statutory definition provides
three ways in which a federal court may qualify as a court of competent jurisdiction for
purposes of the SCA, which are joined by the word “or.” This conjunction indicates that the
court issuing the warrant does not necessarily have to be located within the same jurisdiction
as the location where the electronic communications, records, or other information are
stored. Any federal district court, federal magistrate judge, or United States appellate court
that meets the court of competent jurisdiction definition may issue a warrant, subpoena, or
court order for information protected by the SCA. See generally Hubbard v. MySpace, Inc.,
788 F. Supp. 2d 319, 323–24 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
18 U.S.C. § 2711(3)(B) (2018) (emphasis added).
132 CONG. REC. 14,886 (1986) (statement of Rep. Kastenmeier) (“[L]egislation which
protects electronic communications from interceptions by either private parties or the
Government should be comprehensive, and not limited to particular types or techniques of
communicating.”); see also United States v. Councilman, 418 F.3d 67, 79 (1st Cir. 2005) (en
banc) (concluding “that the term ‘electronic communication’ includes transient electronic
storage that is intrinsic to the communication process for such communications.”).
Hubbard, 788 F. Supp. 2d at 323–24.
39
40

41
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A governmental entity may require the disclosure by a
provider of electronic communication service of the
contents of a wire or electronic communication, that is in
electronic storage in an electronic communications system
for one hundred and eighty days or less, only pursuant to a
warrant issued using the procedures described in the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure by a court with
jurisdiction over the offense under investigation or an
equivalent State warrant. 42
Thus, a state court could have the authority to issue a warrant by either
having jurisdiction over the offense being investigated or by being in the
district where the stored communications are located.
State authority to issue warrants under the SCA is identical to the
federal authority, though additional process might be required to ensure a
warrant’s validity if issued by the state court judge. 43 The U.S. District Court
for the Southern District of New York in the case of Hubbard v. Myspace,
On December 1, 2007, Georgia authorities arrested plaintiff for
contributing to the delinquency of a minor and “enticing a child for
indecent purposes.” On January 29, 2008, in the course of investigating
plaintiff’s alleged crimes, the sheriff’s office of Cherokee County,
Georgia, obtained a search warrant from the Magistrate Court of
Cherokee County. The warrant instructed “all peace officers of the state
of Georgia” to search MySpace’s custodian of records in Beverly Hills,
California, for:
“Records concerning the identity of the user with
the Friend ID 79001021 consisting of name, postal
code, country, e-mail address, date of account
creation, IP address at account sign-up, logs
showing IP address and date stamps for account
accesses, and the contents of any private messages
in the user’s inbox and sent mail folders.”
That same day, the sheriff’s office faxed the warrant to MySpace’s
custodian of records in California. MySpace subsequently “accessed and
produced and disclosed the requested personal and private user
information, data, records and/or the contents of electronic
communications to law enforcement.”
Id. at 321. Hubbard ultimately entered a guilty plea but later sued Myspace, alleging that
“MySpace’s disclosure of records and information pertaining to his account violated the
Stored Communications Act. . . .” Id. The Hubbard court noted that extraterritorial warrants
are permissible under 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) and dismissed the complaint. Id. at 325–26.
18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) (2009) (emphasis added).
See Hubbard, 788 F. Supp. 2d. at 325. While Hubbard states “Section 2703(a) does not
impermissibly expand the power of Georgia magistrates or any other courts,” the court’s
analysis seems to suggest that, if the warrant issued by the state magistrate conforms to the
requirements of a SCA warrant issued by a federal magistrate, then the warrant will be
enforceable so long as the state has a long-arm statute allowing for extraterritorial
applicability, as Georgia did in this case. Id. at 326.
42
43
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Inc., focusing on the “equivalent State warrant” portion of this statute, held

that the qualifications of a federal court to be a court of competent
jurisdiction were implicitly applied to the qualifications of a state court. 44
The Hubbard court interpreted the “jurisdiction over the offense under
investigation” provision to require only that the judge has the authority to
issue a warrant for the investigation; there is no requirement for the issuing
judge to have the jurisdiction to preside over a trial for the suspect for whom
the warrant is issued. 45 The court found that by passing the SCA, Congress
“specifically intended to allow federal courts to authorize searches beyond
their normal territorial jurisdictions,” 46 and if this is true of federal courts,
“the same ought to be true of equivalent state warrants.” 47 Hubbard further
noted that Georgia law “appears to recognize the heightened territorial
authority that magistrates and judges may have in issuing [SCA] warrants.” 48
Congress clearly intended for warrants issued under the SCA by a
court of competent jurisdiction to extend beyond territorial jurisdiction; as
the Ackies 49 court articulated, the SCA empowered courts to “permit
searches . . . beyond the courts’ usual geographic jurisdictions.” 50 The House
Report clarified this point in 2001 when the PATRIOT Act, which
amended the SCA in part, passed:
An investigator, for example, located in Boston who is
investigating a suspected terrorist in that city, might have to
seek a suspect’s electronic e-mail from an Internet service
44
45
46
47
48

Id.
Id. at 324.
Id. at 325.
Id. at 326.
Id. While this case was heard in the Southern District of New York, the search warrant at

issue (which plaintiff claimed violated the SCA) was issued by a state magistrate in Georgia,
authorizing “all peace officers of the state of Georgia” to search MySpace records relevant to
the plaintiff’s alleged offenses under a Georgia law that criminalized “contributing to the
delinquency of a minor and ‘enticing a child for indecent purposes.’” Id. at 321. MySpace, a
company located in California, had a choice of forum provision within its Terms of Use
Agreement, making New York the appropriate forum. Class Action Complaint at 3,
Hubbard v. MySpace, Inc., 788 F. Supp. 2d 319 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (No. 11-CV-0433).
United States v. Ackies, 918 F.3d 190, 202 (1st Cir. 2019). “Law enforcement began
investigating Ackies in the fall of 2015, beginning with information from a cooperating witness
who became a cooperating defendant . . . concerning his drug trafficking with a man he knew
then as ‘Boyd’ (determined at trial to be Ackies).” Id. at 195. Investigators obtained precise
location information (PLI) “from a magistrate judge in Maine pursuant to a provision of the
SCA, 18 U.S.C. § 2703, and Fed. R. Crim. P. 41 (‘Rule 41’) for two cell phones.” Id. “Ackies
was arrested . . . and charged in February 2016 with violations of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and
841(a)(1), conspiracy to possess and possession with intent to distribute heroin and cocaine
base.” Id. The defendant moved to suppress the PLI warrants on several grounds, but the
First Circuit rejected the defendant’s attempt to apply Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure to limit the jurisdiction conferred by the SCA. Id. at 201–03.
Id. at 202.
49

50
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provide[r] (ISP) account located in California. The
investigator would then need to coordinate with agents,
prosecutors and judges in the district in California where
the ISP is located to obtain a warrant to search . . . . [The
Act] amends § 2703 to authorize the court with jurisdiction
over the investigation to issue the warrant directly. 51
Further, the text of § 2711 clarifies that “the term ‘court of competent
jurisdiction’ includes . . . a court of general criminal jurisdiction of a State
authorized by the law of that State to issue search warrants.” 52 One court
acknowledged that the word “includes” was originally the word “means”
prior to the 2009 amendment to the SCA; by using the word “includes,”
Congress intended to expand the definition of “court of competent
jurisdiction.” 53 This same court acknowledged that each state may have
differing procedures and laws regarding the operation of the state court
system. 54 To avoid this problem, Congress used broad language to create a
statute that allows for the authorization of many types of state courts to issue
warrants under the SCA, provided that the court has general criminal
jurisdiction. 55
The only remaining jurisdictional hurdle to clear, if any, is posed
by a state’s constitution or long-arm statute. 56 In the absence of any clear
prohibition by state law, the SCA confers jurisdiction to state courts in this

Id. (citing H.R. REP. NO. 107-236, pt. 1, at 57 (2001)); see also In re Yahoo, Inc., No. 073194-MB, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37601 (D. Ariz. May 21, 2007) (finding that Congress
intended for district courts to have the authority under the Electronic Communications
Privacy Act to obtain electronically-stored communications from other jurisdictions).
18 U.S.C. § 2711(3)(B) (2018).
John K. MacIver Inst. for Pub. Pol’y, Inc. v. Schmitz, 243 F.Supp.3d 1028, 1033 (W.D.
Wis. 2017). “In this civil action, The John K. MacIver Institute for Public Policy, Inc.,
purports to assert class claims against various state actors, alleging that they violated the [SCA]
. . . by seizing electronic information pursuant to search warrants issued by a County Circuit
Court Judge during the course of a Wisconsin . . . proceeding.” Id. at 1030. The defendants
moved to dismiss, in part based on SCA statutory defenses. The court granted the motions
to dismiss, finding no SCA violation since the warrants in question were issued by a court of
competent jurisdiction. Id. at 1032–35. Among other arguments for a broader interpretation
of SCA jurisdiction, the court noted that “the SCA specifically makes valid warrants issued
by federal magistrate judges[, which] further suggests that Congress did not intend to
exclusively limit those [SCA-conferred] powers to judges who can enter felony judgments.”
Id. at 1034.
51

52
53

Id.
Id.
See infra Part VI (listing state long-arm statutes and related case law); see also Long-Arm
Statutes:
A
Fifty-State
Survey,
VEDDER
PRICE
(2003),

54

55
56

http://euro.ecom.cmu.edu/program/law/08-732/Jurisdiction/LongArmSurvey.pdf
[https://perma.cc/32WS-GZDJ].
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context; 57 SCA warrants are not limited to the territorial jurisdiction of the
issuing authority. 58 This “promote[s] prosecutorial and judicial efficiency by
permitting courts in locus of crime to preside over both investigation and
adjudication,” and also relieves the burden on courts in jurisdictions that
host larger internet-service providers. 59

C.

Fourth Amendment Implications and Stored Communications Act
Trajectory

As mentioned previously, the third-party doctrine and the SCA
are less than perfect means for handling today’s technology which, when
considering the collective data from these powerful devices, paints a nearperfect picture of individuals’ daily lives. This picture is much more intimate
than a thermal imaging device, 60 disclosing “at what hour each night the lady
See State v. Esarey, 67 A.3d 1001, 1008 n.17 (Conn. 2013) (“Indeed, there is nothing in
the language of § 54-33a, our search warrant statute, that expressly restricts a trial judge’s
authority to order searches to Connecticut’s borders. . . . Thus, consistent with the Stored
Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2703(b), it would appear to us that, under our existing
statutes, a Connecticut trial judge may, in connection with the investigation of a crime
committed here, order a search of electronically stored communications contained on a
remote computing service’s server located in another state . . . .”).
Hubbard v. MySpace, Inc., 788 F.Supp.2d 319, 325 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
Esarey, 67 A.3d at 1008 (analyzing In re Yahoo, Inc., No. 07-3194-MB, 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 37601 (D. Ariz. May 21, 2007)). Commentators have opined that certain Patriot Act
amendments were designed “to shift the responsibility for issuance” of search warrants from
courts where service providers are located “to the court with jurisdiction over the offense
being investigated,” since prior to the Patriot Act, “a disproportionate number of such orders
were issued in the Eastern District of Virginia, where AOL is located.” Patricia L. Bellia,
Surveillance Law Through Cyberlaw’s Lens, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1375, 1454 (Aug.
2004). This was also calculated to reduce the unnecessary costs, which accompany
domestication of search warrants. Paul K. Ohm, Parallel Effect Statutes and E-mail
“Warrants”: Reframing the Internet Surveillance Debate, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1599,
1614–15, n.80 (Aug. 2004) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 107-236, pt. 1, at 57 (2001)).
The Kyllo Court determined whether use of a thermal-imaging device aimed at
a private residence was considered a “search” within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment.
In 1991 Agent William Elliott of the United States Department of the
Interior came to suspect that marijuana was being grown in the home
belonging to petitioner Danny Kyllo. . . . Indoor marijuana growth
typically requires high-intensity lamps. In order to determine whether
an amount of heat was emanating from petitioner’s home consistent with
the use of such lamps, at 3:20 a.m. on January 16, 1992, Agent Elliott
and Dan Haas used an Agema Thermovision 210 thermal imager to
scan the triplex. Thermal imagers detect infrared radiation, which
virtually all objects emit but which is not visible to the naked eye. The
imager converts radiation into images based on relative warmth -- black
is cool, white is hot, shades of gray connote relative differences; in that
respect, it operates somewhat like a video camera showing heat images.
The scan of Kyllo’s home took only a few minutes and was performed
57

58
59

60
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of the house takes her daily sauna and bath,” 61 and infinitely more
comprehensive of a person’s daily movements than could ever be obtained
through a law enforcement officer’s personal observation of an individual’s
movements on the street.
The Supreme Court has recognized, even if it has not directly
confronted, the Fourth Amendment privacy issues created by the SCA and
the third-party doctrine. The Court seems to favor a reasonable expectation
of privacy approach, which may take the form of a pattern of life analysis
and mosaic theory approach. This Section discusses the Supreme Court’s
present views on the third-party doctrine and predicts how the Court may
handle future challenges to the SCA on Fourth Amendment grounds.
The Court has maintained that the third-party doctrine, as applied
to content protected under the SCA, is still good law; however, in recent
years, the Court has noted that digital data stored on a device and sent to
servers belonging to cell phone providers may require more protection, but
it has not overturned Smith or Miller. 62 Two major concepts are relevant for
discussing a broad means of protection for potentially revealing digital data
rather than the “one size fits all” approach currently present in the thirdparty doctrine. These concepts are known as the mosaic theory and pattern
of life analysis and, while distinct, discussion of one necessarily requires
discussion of the other in the same context.
The idea behind the mosaic theory 63 is that a long-term, large-scale
data collection effort may reveal details about an individual that a single
from the passenger seat of Agent Elliott’s vehicle across the street from
the front of the house and also from the street in back of the house. The
scan showed that the roof over the garage and a side wall of petitioner’s
home were relatively hot compared to the rest of the home and
substantially warmer than neighboring homes in the triplex. Agent Elliott
concluded that petitioner was using halide lights to grow marijuana in
his house, which indeed he was. Based on tips from informants, utility
bills, and the thermal imaging, a Federal Magistrate Judge issued a
warrant authorizing a search of petitioner’s home, and the agents found
an indoor growing operation involving more than 100 plants.
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 29–30 (2001) (holding that the thermal imaging
constituted an unlawful search).
Id. at 38.
See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012) (finding that attachment of a GPS device
to a vehicle and surveillance of vehicle’s movements on public streets was a “search” within
the Fourth Amendment); Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018) (finding
government surveillance of an individual’s physical movements captured through CSLI was
considered a “search”); see also Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 (2014) (holding interest in
protecting officers’ safety and preventing destruction of evidence did not justify dispensing
with warrant requirements for searches of cell phone data).
Cultural anthropology and financial investment analysis both use the term “mosaic theory.”
Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 111 MICH. L. REV. 311, 313
(2012). In a legal context, the term was first coined by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
61
62

63
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observation could not reveal. 64 A mosaic is composed of hundreds or
thousands of pieces of glass; looking at each piece individually, one cannot
discern much. When those pieces of glass are arranged in a particular way,
one may step back and look at the pieces of glass to see the beautiful image
that is formed. Likewise, different digital data pieces may be gathered from
various sources that do not reveal much about the user, but when put
together, a larger picture of the person’s daily life may form. Putting the
pieces together forms the mosaic; adding more pieces forms an even larger
mosaic. Stepping back and looking at the whole mosaic to see something
much more than the sum of its parts is the pattern of life analysis.
The pattern of life analysis refers to figuring out the normal habits
of a person’s life—both public and private. 65 Traditional law enforcement
and intelligence techniques can establish a pattern of life for a particular
person; however, technology allows law enforcement to establish a pattern
of life in a more comprehensive manner. This can be done through
examining the digital evidence on a smartphone—call logs, GPS coordinates,
time-stamped photos 66—or any number of other digital devices, from
wearable health monitors to home assistants to smart vehicles.
For example, a law enforcement officer working the beat may see
an individual enter a gym at nine o’clock on a Tuesday morning, but the
officer may not know what the individual does after leaving the gym unless
the officer followed him. This type of investigation requires time, personnel,
and documentation. If the same officer wished to track the same individual’s
movements by using the GPS data from the individual’s cell phone, then
the officer would have an even more comprehensive picture of the
individual’s whereabouts than if the officer followed the individual.
Each individual GPS data point (the pieces of glass in the mosaic
analogy) places the individual at a particular location at a particular time.
The officer, with very little effort other than requesting the information from
the cell phone provider, will be able to see that individual’s pattern of life.
The officer may note that the individual goes to the gym four days a week,
works in an office building downtown, and visits the Protestant church once
a week. These details, while seemingly innocent on the surface, may prove
to reveal much more personal information that an individual may not wish
to disclose to anyone—let alone law enforcement—such as the individual’s
religious or political affiliations or sexual practices.

District of Columbia Circuit in United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2010), an
underpinning of Jones. Id.
Paul Rozenzweig, In Defense of the Mosaic Theory, LAWFARE (Nov. 29, 2017),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/defense-mosaic-theory [https://perma.cc/VMZ9-NLXY].
64

65
66

Id.
Id.
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The Supreme Court has shifted away from strict application of
the third-party doctrine to analyzing the type of data collected, the amount
of data collected, and the time period represented by the data. 67 This shift
began in United States v. Jones, which was decided on other grounds, but
Justice Sotomayor criticized the third-party doctrine in a separate concurring
opinion. 68 Justice Sotomayor noted that the Court should revisit the thirdparty doctrine, stating,
This approach is ill suited to the digital age, in which
people reveal a great deal of information about themselves
to third parties in the course of carrying out mundane tasks.
. . . I for one doubt that people would accept without
complaint the warrantless disclosure to the Government of
a list of every Web site they had visited in the last week, or
month, or year. But whatever the societal expectations,
they can attain constitutionally protected status only if our
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence ceases to treat secrecy
as a prerequisite for privacy. 69
In its continued reexamination of digital data, the Court in Riley v.
California 70 held that the Fourth Amendment prohibited a warrantless
67

See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. 2206; Riley, 573 U.S. at 37.

United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 430 (2012). In Jones, the government placed a
tracking device on the undercarriage of the defendant’s wife’s car, and the government
tracked the car (used by the defendant for drug operations) over the course of four weeks.
Id. at 403. Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, seemed to resurrect the long-dead trespass
analysis for determining whether a search under the Fourth Amendment has occurred. Id.
at 404–12. Justice Alito noted in concurrence that trespass is unnecessary for many forms of
surveillance. Id. at 429–31 (Alito, J., concurring). Justice Sotomayor, elaborating on Justice
Alito’s comment, noted the reasonable expectation of privacy test, as established in Katz v.
United States, augmented the trespass test, meaning trespass is sufficient (but not necessary)
to find a search took place. Id. at 414–16 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (citing Katz v. United
States, 389, U.S. 347, 361 (1967)). This is particularly important in today’s age with
electronically stored data, and Justice Sotomayor discusses the dangers of relying on the
majority’s opinion and the trespass analysis alone since there can be no physical trespass of
digital data. Id. at 417–18.
Id. (emphasis added).
573 U.S. 373 (2014).
David Riley was stopped by a police officer for driving with expired
registration tags. In the course of the stop, the officer also learned that
Riley’s license had been suspended. The officer impounded Riley’s car,
pursuant to department policy, and another officer conducted an
inventory search of the car. Riley was arrested for possession of
concealed and loaded firearms when that search turned up two
handguns under the car’s hood.
An officer searched Riley incident to the arrest and found items
associated with the “Bloods” street gang. He also seized a cell phone
from Riley’s pants pocket. According to Riley’s uncontradicted
assertion, the phone was a “smart phone,” a cell phone with a broad
68

69
70
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search of a cell phone, on the grounds that a cell phone does not pose a risk
to officer safety to justify a search of the phone’s contents incident to its
owner’s arrest. The Court noted the cell phones’ immense storage capacity
and that the data stored on a cell phone can provide a means of
reconstructing a person’s private life. 71
The Court in Riley did not create a separate standard for digital
data, yet the Court acknowledged the importance of cell phones in today’s
society, which helped form the Supreme Court’s future analysis. Carpenter
v. United States held that cell site location information (CSLI) cannot be
obtained from cellular service providers by law enforcement without a
warrant. 72 Justice Roberts, writing for the majority, decided that CSLI
deserves heightened protection due to the data’s revealing nature, and
society would not reasonably expect law enforcement to be able to monitor
and document every individual’s movement with near-perfect precision. 73
The Court did not explicitly overrule Smith or Miller to invalidate the thirdparty doctrine; Carpenter merely works within the confines of the thirdparty doctrine and creates an exception for CSLI. Justice Alito criticized the
Court’s decision for being entirely unprecedented. 74
Because the Court is beginning to question the third-party
doctrine’s utility in today’s digital world, prosecutors should be prepared for
the different avenues of legal process to undergo change or become more
range of other functions based on advanced computing capability, large
storage capacity, and Internet connectivity. The officer accessed
information on the phone and noticed that some words (presumably in
text messages or a contacts list) were preceded by the letters “CK”—a
label that, he believed, stood for “Crip Killers,” a slang term for
members of the Bloods gang.
At the police station about two hours after the arrest, a detective
specializing in gangs further examined the contents of the phone. The
detective testified that he “went through” Riley’s phone “looking for
evidence.” . . . The police also found photographs of Riley standing in
front of a car they suspected had been involved in a shooting a few weeks
earlier.
Riley was ultimately charged, in connection with that earlier shooting,
with firing at an occupied vehicle, assault with a semiautomatic firearm,
and attempted murder. . . . Prior to trial, Riley moved to suppress all
evidence that the police had obtained from his cell phone. He
contended that the searches of his phone violated the Fourth
Amendment, because they had been performed without a warrant and
were not otherwise justified by exigent circumstances. The trial court
rejected that argument.
Id. at 378–79 (internal citations omitted).
Id. at 394.
138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018).
Id. at 2218.
Id. at 2247.
71
72
73
74
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stringent. It appears that, based on the cases discussed above and the
Justices’ opinions on privacy protections for digital data, the Court may be
heading in the direction of adopting a pattern of life and mosaic theory
analysis. An alternative trajectory may focus on a strict review of search
warrant affidavits, comparing the specific facts of the affidavit’s probable
cause section to determine whether each category of data requested for
search and seizure is supported by probable cause and particularity for that
discrete data type. In support of this trend, boilerplate search warrants for
“all” the data on a device, or in an account, are being routinely rejected, or
in the alternative, courts highlight the specific facts supporting unique data
types and indicating that only those specific categories could be searched. 75
The Justices seem to favor emphasis of privacy concerns over the
traditional third-party doctrine because when the third-party doctrine was
created, the technology available to the general public was much more
simplistic, and the third-party doctrine is impractical considering the sheer
volume of revealing, personal data that is collected from individuals’ devices
every second. From this discussion, it is the authors’ opinion that, if
practicable, law enforcement officers should always obtain a warrant for the
contents of communications, even if that data may otherwise be obtained
through a 2703(d) order or subpoena.
Beyond the Supreme Court opinions, state courts and legislatures
are also emphasizing privacy over the traditional third-party doctrine. In the
2020 election, Michigan voters took a dramatic step and approved an
amendment to the state constitution which expanded warrant requirements
to include electronic data and electronic communications. 76 As amended,
the Michigan Constitution requires a warrant for the government “to access
electronic data or electronic communication.” 77 It is unclear if the
“[S]eparate probable cause is required to search each of the categories of information found
on the cellphones.” United States v. Morton, 984 F.3d 421, 425 (5th Cir. 2021). “[T]he
November 12th Warrant did not seek any and all data or digital information; instead, it
sought only five enumerated categories of digital information. The November 12th Warrant
did not contain language that would suggest an impermissibly broad scope such as ‘any and
all’ or ‘including but not limited to.’ The categories limited the search to call logs, subscriber
information, and various forms of messaging. The November 12th Warrant described what
the officers believed would be found on the phone with specificity [to the text of the note]
and thereby satisfied an important metric in judging particularity. Further, the November
12th Warrant was limited to a three-day period around the shooting, unlike the warrants in
Wheeler and Buckham that lacked any temporal limitations.” State v. Wilson, No.
1904007242, 2021 Del. Super. LEXIS 84, at *15 (Del. Super. Ct. Jan. 29, 2021).
See Lester Graham, Election 2020: Michigan Voters Approve Proposal 2, Protecting
Electronic Data, MICH. RADIO (Nov. 4, 2020), https://www.michiganradio.org/post/election2020-michigan-voters-approve-proposal-2-protecting-electronic-data
[https://perma.cc/6SDT-9SQV].
Id. Proposal 2 amended Article 1, Section 11 of the Michigan Constitution to read as
follows:
75

76

77
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amendment refers only to data stored locally or if the amendment covers
data stored by service providers. If the latter holds true, Michigan has
effectively eliminated the third-party doctrine when applied to electronic
data and communications.
In some states without codified exceptions to the third-party
doctrine for electronic data and communications, state courts have stepped
in to provide such exceptions, and in some cases, eliminated the third-party
doctrine altogether. 78 A recent outlier decision from Arizona, State v.
Mixton, 79 saw the court decline to apply the third-party doctrine in a case
involving a defendant’s IP address. There, the court found a reasonable
expectation of privacy in one’s IP address and required a search warrant to
obtain one’s IP address, in direct conflict with numerous jurisdictions. 80
The person, houses, papers, and possessions, electronic data, and
electronic communications of every person shall be secure from
unreasonable searches and seizures. No warrant to search any place or
to seize any person or things or to access electronic data or electronic
communications shall issue without describing them, nor without
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation. . . .

Statewide Ballot Proposal 20-2: Protection of Electronic Data and Communications,
CITIZENS RSCH. COUNCIL MICHIGAN (Oct. 2020), https://crcmich.org/wpcontent/uploads/Memo1164-Proposal_2_Search_and_seizure_of_electronic_data.pdf
[https://perma.cc/XWL3-UJSF].
See, e.g., People v. Chapman, 679 P.2d 62, 67 n.6 (Cal. 1984) (rejecting the “fiction” in
Miller and Smith that a person has no reasonable expectation of privacy in bank or phone
call records); People v. Sporleder, 666 P.2d 135, 141–42 (Colo. 1983) (rejecting Smith and
finding reasonable expectation of privacy in phone numbers dialed); Charnes v. DiGiacomo,
612 P.2d 1117, 1120–21 (Colo. 1980) (rejecting Miller in construing state constitution’s
search-and-seizure provisions); Shaktman v. State, 553 So. 2d 148, 151 (Fla. 1989)
(replicating the finding in Sporleder); State v. Walton, 324 P.3d 876, 906 (Haw. 2014)
(indicating that Miller and Smith “incorrectly rely on the principle that individuals who
convey information to a third party have assumed the risk of that party disclosing the
information to the government. In our times individuals may have no reasonable
alternative”); State v. Thompson, 760 P.2d 1162, 1165 (Idaho 1988) (finding that “in Idaho
there is a legitimate and reasonable expectation of privacy in the phone numbers that are
dialed.”); People v. DeLaire, 610 N.E.2d 1277, 1282 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (describing how
“[the court] believe[s] that citizens have a legitimate expectation that their telephone records
will not be disclosed”); Commonwealth v. DeJohn, 403 A.2d 1283, 1289 (Pa. 1979) (“As we
believe that Miller establishes a dangerous precedent, with great potential for abuse, we
decline to follow that case when construing the state constitutional protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures.”); State v. Thompson, 810 P.2d 415, 418 (Utah 1991)
(rejecting Miller).
447 P.3d 829 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2019).
See, e.g., Hatcher v. State, 726 S.E.2d 117, 120 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012) (“[W]e doubt that an
Internet service subscriber can have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the subscriber
information that he voluntarily conveys to an Internet service provider in order to obtain
Internet service.”); State v. Baric, 919 N.W.2d 221, 228 (Wis. Ct. App. 2018) (“Baric has
not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that he had a reasonable expectation of
privacy in . . . his IP address.”); State v. Lemasters, No. CA2012-12-028, 2013 Ohio App.
LEXIS 3009, at *12 (Ohio Ct. App. July 8, 2013) (“Lemaster’s Fourth Amendment rights
78

79
80
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The Mixton court looked to New Jersey for support in finding a
reasonable expectation of privacy in IP addresses 81 but failed to
acknowledge that New Jersey allows law enforcement to obtain IP addresses
with a subpoena. 82 The decision relies heavily on New Jersey as an example
of a growing trend toward expansions of privacy outweighing law
enforcement interests in investigating crimes. While the rationale of the
Mixton court was incorrect and ultimately corrected by the Arizona
Supreme Court, 83 both the trajectory of privacy-oriented jurisprudence and
the wisdom of obtaining search warrants when practicable, are undeniable.

were not implicated by Detective Penwell’s use of the file-sharing system, or in his obtaining
Lemasters’ information from Time Warner based upon Lemaster’s IP address.”); State v.
Rodriguez, No. P2-2014-3011A, 2017 R.I. Super. LEXIS 89, at *28 (R.I. Super. Ct. May
30, 2017) (“Defendant has not established either a subjectively or objectively reasonable
expectation of privacy in the subscriber information held by Verizon.”); State v. Mello, 27
A.3d 771 (2011) (finding individuals have no expectation of privacy in non-content data
shared with a service provider); Commonwealth v. Do, 86 Va. Cir. 483 (Cir. Ct. 2013)
(finding that a defendant’s subjective intent to hide his IP address does not create a
reasonable expectation of privacy); State v. Leblanc, 137 So. 3d 656, 662 (La. Ct. App. 2014)
(“[W]here an internet subscriber voluntarily discloses routine billing information to an ISP
in order to receive service, he has no reasonable expectation of privacy in that information,
and, therefore, the issuance of a search warrant for its disclosure would not be required.”);
State v. Peppin, 347 P.3d 906 (Wash. Ct. App. 2015) (holding there is no reasonable
expectation of privacy in data exposed publicly); State v. Roberts, 345 P.3d 1226, 1236 (Utah
2015) (noting “the overwhelming weight of authority finding no reasonable expectation of
privacy in subscription information, like an IP address, given to an internet service
provider”).
See State v. Reid, 945 A.2d 26, 33 (N.J. 2008) (noting that internet users are “entitled to
expect confidentiality” in this information, and the fact that they have disclosed their
identities to third party internet service providers “does not upend the privacy interest at
stake”).
See id. at 36 (explaining that a finding of a reasonable expectation of privacy under the state
constitution does not necessarily trigger a warrant requirement and that a grand jury
subpoena satisfies the requirements of the New Jersey Constitution as long as the data “bear
some possible relationship[, however indirect,] to the grand jury investigation” (citing State v.
Mcallister, 875 A.2d 866, 876 (N.J. 2005))).
See State v. Mixton, 478 P.3d 1227, 1229 (Ariz. 2021) (holding that search warrants and
court orders are not required to obtain IP addresses and other ISP subscriber information
and that an administrative subpoena is sufficient). The Arizona Supreme Court noted that
an expectation of privacy in this “non-content information is unreasonable in light of the
nature of the information; it is voluntarily shared with third parties; and such third parties
own, and often engage in pervasive legal derivative use” of the information. Id. at 1240.
81

82

83
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CLARIFYING LAWFUL OVERSEAS USE OF DATA ACT
(CLOUD) ACT 84

The CLOUD Act aims to combat the recent influx of data requests
to US-based global providers from abroad in a manner that protects user
privacy and civil liberties. 85 The CLOUD Act amends the SCA to include
an affirmative statement that the SCA covers data stored on servers located
outside the United States. The CLOUD Act contains two central parts: (1)
the provision for access to foreign stored data and (2) the authorization of
bilateral executive agreements to facilitate sharing data held by entities
within the United States with law enforcement in foreign sovereign
jurisdictions. 86

A.

Access to Foreign Stored Data

First, the CLOUD Act facilitates access to electronic information,
even if it is stored overseas, for law enforcement investigations. 87 Data
covered by the CLOUD Act is the same data covered by the other SCA
provisions, namely, “contents of a wire or electronic communication and
any record or other information pertaining to a customer or subscriber.” 88
The data sought must be in a United States corporation’s, organization’s, or
legal person’s possession or control. 89 When law enforcement successfully
obtains a warrant to access data protected by the SCA and stored abroad,
the warrant must be honored.
An issue presented in United States v. Microsoft Corporation led
to the CLOUD Act’s provision on foreign-stored data. 90 In 2013, the federal
government investigated a drug-trafficking operation and sought a warrant
under the SCA to require Microsoft to produce all emails and information
associated with an account hosted by Microsoft. 91 The emails the
government sought were stored on a server owned by Microsoft and located
The authors are grateful to Zero Abuse Project’s legal extern Kiley Eichelberg for her
research contributions.
THE PURPOSE AND IMPACT OF THE CLOUD ACT, supra note 36.
The CLOUD Act, EPIC ELEC. PRIV. INFO. CTR. (Oct. 29, 2019),
https://epic.org/privacy/cloud-act/ [https://perma.cc/LUL6-V4E6].
84

85
86

87

Id.

18 U.S.C. § 2713 (2018).
18 U.S.C. § 2703(h)(1)(B) (2018) defines “United States person” by cross-referencing to
18 U.S.C. § 2523(a)(2) (2018) (“[A] citizen or national of the United States, an alien lawfully
admitted for permanent residence, an unincorporated association a substantial number of
members of which are citizens of the United States or aliens lawfully admitted for permanent
residence, or a corporation that is incorporated in the United States.”).
Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 829 F.3d 197 (2d Cir. 2016), vacated and remanded by
United States v. Microsoft Corp., 138 S. Ct. 1186 (2018).
Microsoft Corp., 138 S. Ct. at 1187.
88
89

90

91
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in Dublin, Ireland. 92 Microsoft challenged the search warrant’s validity as
applied to the emails, arguing that a United States magistrate does not have
the jurisdiction to issue a warrant for digital information stored abroad. 93 A
United States magistrate reviewed the challenge and held that a warrant
under the SCA functions as a warrant and a subpoena—the latter of which
is not restricted by territorial jurisdictional boundaries—and required
Microsoft to turn over the emails. 94 A district judge upheld the magistrate’s
ruling. 95
Microsoft appealed to the Second Circuit. The United Kingdom
Government filed an amicus brief, stating that if the United States
government wished to obtain data located in Ireland, then the United States
should use the MLAT between the United States and Ireland. 96 The Second
Circuit overturned the district court’s ruling, invalidating the warrant. 97 The
court held the SCA cannot apply extraterritorially without explicit
Congressional intent and found no such intent by Congress. 98 The Second
Circuit denied the government’s petition for a rehearing en banc. 99
The United States government filed a petition for certiorari in the
United States Supreme Court in June 2017, which the Court granted in
October 2017. 100 After the Court heard oral arguments, Congress
introduced the CLOUD Act, which was signed into law on March 23,
2018. 101 The CLOUD Act resolved the issues presented in United States v.
Microsoft Corp., and the Supreme Court declared the case moot.

B.

Bilateral Agreements

The CLOUD Act addresses foreign governments’ ability to access
data stored in the United States in the course of criminal investigations. 102 It
does this by providing the authority to create bilateral agreements between
the United States and other countries. 103 Presently, the United States has
only entered into a bilateral agreement with the United Kingdom, though
Australia has now paved the way through its domestic law to allow the
92
93
94
95

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

Brief of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland as
Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party, United States v. Microsoft Corp., 829 F.3d 197
(2d Cir. 2016) (No. 17-2), 2017 WL 6398769.
Microsoft Corp., 829 F.3d at 201–02.
Id. at 211.
Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 855 F.3d 53 (2d Cir. 2017).
United States v. Microsoft Corp., 138 S. Ct. 356 (Oct. 16, 2017) (mem.).
United States v. Microsoft Corp., 138 S. Ct. 1186, 1187 (2018).
The CLOUD Act, supra note 88.
96

97
98
99

100
101
102
103

Id.
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possibility of a future bilateral agreement with the United States. 104 Any
nation wishing to enter into a bilateral agreement with the United States
must be determined by the attorney general and secretary of state to meet
the United States’ high standards of due process and commitment to the
rule of law. 105 Nations with adverse governmental philosophies will not be
permitted to enter into a bilateral agreement with the United States. 106
Honoring warrants issued pursuant to the SCA and the CLOUD
Act allows for a streamlined process, whereby the government may bypass

Anne-Marie Allgrove, Adrian J. Lawrence, Toby Patten & Anne L. Petterd, Australia - Bill
Paves the Way for Australia-US Bilateral CLOUD Act Agreement and a New Cross-Border
Data
Access
Regime,
LEXOLOGY
(June
3,
2020),

104

https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=2cf0f5f7-4a6b-4523-b04c-4674296f9f74
[https://perma.cc/T2PB-6XUC].
18 U.S.C. § 2523(b)(4) (2018).
Id. § 2523(b)(1). The U.S. attorney general with the concurrence of the secretary of state
must provide a written certification to Congress averring, among other considerations, that
(1) the domestic law of the foreign government, including the
implementation of that law, affords robust substantive and procedural
protections for privacy and civil liberties in light of the data collection
and activities of the foreign government that will be subject to the
agreement, if— (A) such a determination under this section takes into
account, as appropriate, credible information and expert input; and (B)
the factors to be met in making such a determination include whether
the foreign government— (i) has adequate substantive and procedural
laws on cybercrime and electronic evidence, as demonstrated by being
a party to the Convention on Cybercrime, done at Budapest November
23, 2001, and entered into force January 7, 2004, or through domestic
laws that are consistent with definitions and the requirements set forth
in chapters I and II of that Convention; (ii) demonstrates respect for the
rule of law and principles of nondiscrimination; (iii) adheres to
applicable international human rights obligations and commitments or
demonstrates respect for international universal human rights,
including— (I) protection from arbitrary and unlawful interference with
privacy; (II) fair trial rights; (III) freedom of expression, association, and
peaceful assembly; (IV) prohibitions on arbitrary arrest and detention;
and (V) prohibitions against torture and cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment or punishment; (iv) has clear legal mandates and procedures
governing those entities of the foreign government that are authorized
to seek data under the executive agreement, including procedures
through which those authorities collect, retain, use, and share data, and
effective oversight of these activities; (v) has sufficient mechanisms to
provide accountability and appropriate transparency regarding the
collection and use of electronic data by the foreign government; and (vi)
demonstrates a commitment to promote and protect the global free flow
of information and the open, distributed, and interconnected nature of
the Internet.
105
106

Id.

2021]

NOT AN OCEAN AWAY, ONLY A MOMENT AWAY

1095

the cumbersome MLAT procedures. 107 The use of MLATs aims to protect
human rights by requiring foreign governments to work with the
Department of Justice to obtain warrants from United States judges before
they can access that data for investigations. 108 Before the CLOUD Act,
foreign governments needed a MLAT ratified by the United States Senate,
approval from the Department of Justice, and authorization by a judge. 109
Now, foreign governments who have entered into a bilateral agreement with
the United States may bypass this time-intensive process.
The CLOUD Act has received its fair share of criticism, mostly
from those concerned about the international human rights implications of
such unfettered access to data. 110 However, because the CLOUD Act is still
in its infancy, since the first bilateral agreement was entered rather recently
(October 3, 2019), 111 we have yet to see if these concerns touted by privacy
advocates have merit in the reality of the CLOUD Act’s operations.
IV.

UNITED STATES—UNITED KINGDOM
BILATERAL AGREEMENT

The United States and the United Kingdom have come to a
bilateral data-sharing agreement, as authorized by the CLOUD Act, which
became effective July 8, 2020. 112 The agreement’s purpose is to combat
Taylor Hatmaker, As the CLOUD Act Sneaks into the Omnibus, Big Tech Butts Heads
Privacy Advocates, TECHCRUNCH (Mar. 22, 2018, 7:06 PM),
https://techcrunch.com/2018/03/22/cloud-act-omnibus-bill-house//
[https://perma.cc/HC5Q-LZA5].

107

with
108
109

Id.
Id.

In October 2019, twenty NGOs objected to the CLOUD Act, claiming it fails to protect
privacy and due process rights of citizens. The CLOUD Act, supra note 88. See Re: U.S.U.K. CLOUD Act Agreement, ELEC. PRIV. INFO. CTR. (Oct. 29, 2019),
https://epic.org/privacy/intl/USUK-CLOUD-Act-Letter-20191028.pdf
[https://perma.cc/J49K-X6EJ] for a list of the objections made by the organizations.
110

Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland on Access to
Electronic Data for the Purpose of Countering Serious Crime, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST.,

111

https://www.justice.gov/dag/cloud-act-agreement [https://perma.cc/A6SX-64D6] [hereinafter

Agreement Between U.S. & U.K.].
Supplementary Letter Conveyed to U.S. Congress in Support of U.S.-U.K CLOUD Act
Agreement,
U.S.
DEP’T
OF
JUST.
(Jan.
16,
2020),
112

https://www.justice.gov/dag/page/file/1236281/download [https://perma.cc/99FU-ABHL].
The agreement enters into force 180 days after the attorney general provides notice to the
Committee on the Judiciary and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of
Representatives, as well as the Committee on the Judiciary and the Committee on Foreign
Relations of the Senate. Id. The attorney general transmitted notice to all required
committees on December 4, 2019, but a clerical error rendered notice to the Committees of
the House of Representatives ineffective. Id. The error was rectified on January 10, 2020
making the agreement effective on July 8, 2020. Id.
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“serious crime, including terrorism.” 113 The agreement serves as a mutual
acknowledgment that the legal search and seizure frameworks of both the
United States and the United Kingdom provide appropriate and substantial
safeguards that protect the civil liberties of each country’s citizenry. 114 Such
mutual respect provides the rationale for using each country’s own domestic
law for obtaining data that is stored by a covered provider 115 subject to the
exclusive jurisdiction of the other country. 116

A.

Maintenance of Domestic Law

As the data sharing agreement is predicated on mutual respect for
the domestic law of the United States and the United Kingdom, each
country is required to maintain its domestic law to meet the requirements
of the data-sharing agreement. 117 Each country is to ensure that its domestic
law does not prevent providers from complying with the agreement. 118 As a
result, the data-sharing agreement restricts the United States’ ability to pass
legislation that would effectively restrict law enforcement access to data
stored by covered providers. 119
Orders issued pursuant to the agreement are governed by the
domestic law of the issuing country. 120 Effectively, this means that United
States law enforcement can obtain data under this agreement from a United
Kingdom covered provider through the United States’ legal process without
interference from United Kingdom law, such as the General Data
Protection Regulation (GDPR). 121 This does not affect the provider’s right
to raise applicable legal objections. 122

113
114
115

Agreement Between U.S. & U.K., supra note 113, art. 2.1.
Id. art. 3.3.
Id. art. 1.7. “Covered Provider means any private entity to the extent that it: (i) provides to

the public the ability to communicate, or to process or store computer data, by means of a
Computer System or a telecommunications system; or (ii) processes or stores Covered Data
on behalf of an entity defined in subsection (i).” Id.
Id. art. 3.3.
Id. art. 3.1.
116
117
118
119
120
121

Id.
Id.
Id. art. 3.2.
Id. The United Kingdom’s exit from the European Union, commonly known as Brexit,

will likely have an impact on the U.S.-U.K. agreement because the United Kingdom will no
longer require adherence to the GDPR, as this was a law under the European Union.
Information Rights at the End of the Transition Period Frequently Asked Questions, INFO.
COMM’R’S
OFF.,
https://ico.org.uk/media/fororganisations/documents/brexit/2617110/information-rights-and-brexit-faqs-v2_3.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9WEM-BL38]. The United Kingdom plans to create its own GDPR,
which will directly incorporate the European Union’s GDPR. Id.
Agreement Between U.S. & U.K., supra note 113, art. 3.2.
122
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The United Kingdom allows the United States to compel the
production of data through the United States’ domestic law because the
United Kingdom recognizes the United States’ privacy and civil rights
safeguards. 123 Should the United States loosen those safeguards, it is required
to notify the United Kingdom. 124
The agreement does not create a private right of action to obtain,
suppress, or exclude evidence or to impede execution of legal process. 125
However, domestic law may provide a remedy; invoking the data sharing
agreement is not blanket immunization from civil penalties, nor is it an
escape from the grasp of the Fourth Amendment. 126

B.

Proper Targeting

Orders issued under the agreement must have a proper target with
respect to both the crime and the person under investigation. 127 An order
targeting a proper crime has the purpose of preventing, investigating,
detecting, or prosecuting a covered offense. 128 A covered offense is a
“Serious Crime, including terrorist activity.” 129 A serious crime must carry a
maximum sentence of at least three years imprisonment. 130
Orders issued under this agreement cannot intentionally target a
receiving-party person. 131 A receiving-party person is one who, “[w]here the
United Kingdom is the Receiving Party,” is a:
Governmental entity or authority of the state; . . . an
unincorporated association, a substantial number of
members of which are located in [the territories of the
United Kingdom]; . . . a corporation located or registered
in [the territory of the United Kingdom]; or any other
person located in [the territory of the United Kingdom]. 132
In other words, an order under the data-sharing agreement issued by United
States law enforcement cannot target the account of a person or entity
located in the United Kingdom.
Additionally, orders under this agreement may not be used to target
a valid person under the agreement “if the purpose is to obtain information

123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132

Id. art. 3.3.
Id.
Id. art. 3.4.
Id. art. 3.2.
Id. art. 4.1, 4.3–4.
Id. art. 4.1.
Id. art. 1.5.
Id. art. 1.14.
Id. art. 4.3.
Id. art. 1.12.
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concerning a Receiving-Party Person.” 133 All orders must target specific
accounts and must include a specific identifier for the account. 134 Law
enforcement officers cannot use the agreement to infringe upon freedom of
speech, nor may it be used to “disadvantage persons based on their race,
sex, sexual orientation, religion, ethnic origin, or political opinions.” 135

C.

Issuance and Transmission of Orders

United States law enforcement can seek an order compelling the
disclosure of information or for the preservation of data 136 under the
agreement using the domestic laws of the United States. 137 However, orders
under the agreement must be based on minimum requirements “for a
reasonable justification based on articulable and credible facts, particularity,
legality, and severity regarding the conduct under investigation.” 138 As orders
must be in compliance with domestic law, when domestic law imposes a
stricter standard, such a standard must be met. 139
For United States law enforcement officers, this means that the
Electronic Communications Privacy Act will likely dictate the process to
obtain data stored by UK-based service providers. 140 Additionally, an order
for the production of data under this agreement is subject to review and/or
oversight under domestic law of the United States. 141 In this respect,
independent oversight occurs in the issuance of an order under this
agreement, and such oversight is dictated by the domestic legal authority
under which the order is authorized. 142
As with domestic orders, when an order seeks interception of wire
or electronic communications, the order must be for a fixed and limited
duration, cannot last longer than is reasonably necessary, and the
information sought must not be reasonably obtainable through less intrusive
means. 143 Orders under this agreement cannot be issued with the purpose

Id. art. 4.4.
Id. art. 4.5.
Id. art. 4.2.
See generally id. art. 10. The same rules that apply to compelling disclosure of information
stored by a covered provider also apply to preservation orders. See id.
Id. art. 5.1.
Id.
Id.
133
134
135
136

137
138
139

Some states like California may have strict laws similar to the ECPA that limit the type,
manner, or method of obtaining data covered by the ECPA. Be sure to consult both state
and federal law in your jurisdiction prior to your investigation.
Agreement Between U.S. & U.K., supra note 113, art. 5.2.
140

141
142
143

Id.
Id. art. 5.3.
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of providing the information obtained to the United Kingdom or a third
party. 144
Orders are to be directly served on the covered provider by the
designated authority of the issuing party. 145 The designated authority for the
United States is the attorney general. 146 The attorney general may delegate
duties to additional authorities and set rules and conditions for any
additional authorities. 147 All orders must be reviewed by the attorney general,
or his designee, prior to serving them upon providers. 148 The attorney
general must certify that the order complies with the domestic laws of the
United States and that the order fully complies with the agreement. 149 The
provider must be notified that the order is issued pursuant to the agreement
and granted “a point of contact . . . who can provide information on legal or
practical issues relating to the Order.” 150 If the target of the order is not a
citizen of the United States and is located outside the territory of the United
States, the attorney general, or his designee, is to notify the relevant
authorities in the third country where the target is located, unless the
“notification would be detrimental to operational or national security,
impede . . . the investigation, or imperil human rights.” 151
The provider can object to an order issued under the agreement. 152
The provider must raise any objections in a reasonable time to the attorney
general. 153 The attorney general may then respond to the objections. 154 If the
objections are not resolved, the provider may raise the objections with the
United Kingdom’s designated authority. 155 The attorney general and the
United Kingdom’s designated authority may confer to resolve the
objections. 156 If the objections cannot be resolved between the authorities,
then the United Kingdom’s designated authority must notify the attorney
general that the agreement shall not apply to the order. 157 The bilateral

Id. art. 5.4.
Id. art. 5.5.
Id. art. 1.8.
Id. art. 5.5.
Id. art. 5.6.
Id. art. 5.7. The certification must be in writing and included with the order when
transmitted to the covered provider. Id.
Id. art. 5.8–9.
Id. art. 5.10.
Id. art. 5.11. Objections must be specific and based on a reasonable belief that the
agreement has not been properly invoked. Id.
Id. The agreement does not state what constitutes a reasonable time. See id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. art. 5.12.
144
145
146
147
148
149

150
151
152

153
154
155
156
157
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agreement does not explicitly provide for judicial review of a provider’s
objection. 158

D. Production of Information
When an order is properly served on a covered provider, and all
objections have been settled, the covered provider is to produce the
requested information directly to the attorney general. 159 The attorney
general and the provider may make arrangements for the secure
transmission of the order and the information requested in the order. 160 To
aid in the admissibility of evidence obtained through the agreement, law
enforcement officers may require the provider to complete forms attesting
to the authenticity of the records produced or to the absence or nonexistence of such records. 161

E.

Minimization Procedures

The agreement requires the United States to develop a procedure
for ensuring that the targeted account belongs to someone covered by the
agreement. 162 The procedures must be employed in good faith and with
reasonable effort to avoid targeting receiving-party persons. 163

F.

Limitations on Use and Transfer

United States law enforcement is to handle data received through
the agreement in accordance with the domestic laws of the United States. 164
For example, if the information collected under the agreement would be
protected by privacy laws or subject to a Freedom of Information Act
request if collected under domestic law, the information is still covered by
those privacy and freedom of information laws. 165
United States law enforcement cannot transfer data obtained under
the agreement to a third country or international organization without the
United Kingdom’s consent, unless the data has already been made public. 166
Additionally, the agreement expressly prohibits requirements that the

158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166

See generally id. art.1–17.
Id. art. 6.1.
Id. art. 6.2.
Id. art. 6.4.
Id. art. 7.1.
Id.
Id. art. 8.1.
Id.
Id. art. 8.2.

2021]

NOT AN OCEAN AWAY, ONLY A MOMENT AWAY

1101

United States share information obtained under the agreement with the
United Kingdom or with any third-party government and vice versa. 167
Moreover, both the United States and the United Kingdom have
specialized national interests implicated by the agreement. For United States
law enforcement seeking data from a United Kingdom service provider, the
United Kingdom has a particularly strong interest in the death penalty. 168
When United States law enforcement seeks data from the United Kingdom,
it must ask for and receive permission from the United Kingdom in order
to use evidence obtained under this agreement in a death penalty case. 169
The United Kingdom may deny permission, grant permission, or grant
permission subject to conditions of use. 170 The same is true when the United
Kingdom seeks information from the United States where freedom of
speech is implicated. 171 Additional limits may be set as mutually agreed upon
by both parties. 172

G. Compatibility and Non-Exclusivity
The agreement does not affect any other legal authorities or
mechanisms for preserving or obtaining electronic data. 173 The agreement
does not affect legal instruments issued under the domestic law of either
party, requests for mutual legal assistance, or emergency disclosures. 174

H. Expiry and Termination of the Agreement
The agreement is in effect until July 8, 2025. 175 The United States
and the United Kingdom may agree to extend the agreement by agreeing,
in writing, through diplomatic channels. 176 By the same token, the agreement
may be terminated by either party by sending written notice through
diplomatic channels. 177 Termination will be effective one month after the
date of such notice. 178 Should the agreement expire or be terminated, any
data produced under the agreement may continue to be used but must

Id. art. 8.3.
Id. art. 8.4(a).
Id. art. 8.4.
Id.
Id. art. 8.4(b).
Id. art. 8.5.
Id. art. 11.1.
Id.
Id. art. 17.1. The agreement has a term of five years from the date the agreement enters
into force. Id.
Id.
Id. art. 17.2.
Id.
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175

176
177
178
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continue to be subject to the conditions and safeguards of the agreement. 179
Each party bears its own costs arising from the operation of the agreement. 180
V.

A.

HOW PROSECUTORS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT CAN
OBTAIN REMOTELY STORED DATA 181

Search Warrants and Digital Evidence

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
guarantees the “right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects . . . and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause
. . . particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.” 182 Generally speaking, the probable cause element of
the Fourth Amendment is met when the affiant describes why, in their
training and experience, digital evidence will be found in the place to be
searched and is relevant to the crime under investigation. 183 While the
standard is not proof beyond a reasonable doubt, the items sought must
have a nexus to the place being searched, with a “fair probability,” based on
common sense, that said items will be found in the location. 184
The items to be searched equally must be sufficiently described to
avoid the government from unfettered searches of a location not otherwise
relevant to the crime under investigation. 185 Because digital evidence can
physically be contained on thumb drives the size of a thumbnail and
obfuscated by digital “booby traps,” the warrant may necessitate an extensive
search of the device limited by the crime. 186
There equally must be a finding that the evidence sought will be at
the location when law enforcement conducts its search. Unlike guns and
drugs, which are easily disposed of by a criminal, digital evidence is “not the
type of evidence that rapidly dissipates or degrades” 187 when located on a
physical device:
When you delete a file, it goes into a “trash” folder, and
when you direct the computer to “empty” the trash folder
179
180

Id. art. 17.3.
Id. art. 13.

Case studies included in this section and throughout this publication are works of fiction.
Names, characters, entities, places, and incidents either are products of the author’s
imagination or are used fictitiously. Any resemblance to actual events or locales or persons,
living or dead, is entirely coincidental.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
United States v. Bowen, 689 F. Supp. 2d 675, 679–80 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 214 (1983).
United States v. Riley, 906 F.2d 841, 845 (2d Cir. 1990).
Id. at 845 (“[F]ew people keep documents of their criminal transactions in a folder marked
‘drug records.’”).
United States v. Vosburgh, 602 F.3d 512, 529 (3d Cir. 2010).
181

182
183
184
185
186

187
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the contents of the folder, including the deleted file,
disappear. But the file hasn’t left the computer. The trash
folder is a waste-paper basket; it has no drainage pipe to
the outside. The file seems to have vanished only because
the computer has removed it from the user interface and
so the user can’t “see” it any more. 188
As Judge Posner observed in Seiver, it is possible that the file could
be overwritten if the hard drive of the computer is exhausted. 189 To
accomplish this task, however, the user would have to exhaust the significant
size of modern hard drives. Even if overwritten, common sense dictates that
the basic user of digital devices saves their data on a cloud or external hard
drive, thus evidence still likely exists at the location where law enforcement
seeks it. Consequently, though there are multiple possibilities that data
could be encrypted, overwritten, or wiped, “rarely will [these possibilities]
be so probable as to destroy probable cause.” 190 Judge Posner further
observed that:
No doubt after a very long time, the likelihood that the
defendant still has the computer, and if he does that the file
hasn’t been overwritten, or if he’s sold it that the current
owner can be identified, drops to a level at which probable
cause to search the suspect’s home for the computer can
no longer be established. But seven months is too short a
period to reduce the probability that a computer search will
be fruitful to a level at which probable cause has
evaporated. . . . The most important thing to keep in mind
for future cases is the need to ground inquiries into
“staleness” and “collectors” in a realistic understanding of
modern computer technology and the usual behavior of its
users. 191
Judge Posner’s rationale has been met with significant approval by other
courts. 192 This reasoning, however, should not suggest that probable cause
to search a location or device will never go stale but that law enforcement
should sufficiently articulate the fact that remnants of data are not easily
destroyed over time.
188
189
190
191
192

United States v. Seiver, 692 F.3d 774, 776 (7th Cir. 2012).

Id. at 777.
Id.
Id. at 777–78.
See United States v. Valley, 755 F.3d 581, 586–87 (2014) (“But as Seiver makes clear . . .

investigators looking for digital evidence can assume it remains on the hard drive because
modern computers by default retain the data.”); United States v. Carroll, 750 F.3d 700, 707
(2014) (applying Judge Posner’s analysis in rejecting a staleness challenge to the search of
Carroll’s digital devices for child sexual abuse material, despite a delay of sixty months).
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In reviewing affidavits, prosecutors must ensure that warrant
applications adequately describe the location to be searched, what evidence
may be found at the location and where it may be found, and why it would
be found there despite the passage of time. 193 These descriptions must be
based on a realistic understanding of technology, not mere rumor or
happenstance. 194 Prosecutors must be mindful that data may not be stored
on a device but rather held by a cloud service provider. Unlike the physical
digital device, data can be easily deleted from cloud storage. This
information, if preserved by the mechanisms described in the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act, allows law enforcement to ensure key data is
not deleted.

B.

Obtaining Domestically Stored Data

Currently, the most frequent remote data storage scenarios facing
United States law enforcement involve the need to acquire data stored on a
server somewhere in the United States. Since data storage continues to
proliferate in frequency and sophistication, this may not always be the
case. 195 Regardless of the server’s location, however, legal process should be
directed to the internet service provider, not the individual server’s location.
This is logical for several reasons. First, the prospect of law
enforcement serving legal process on the location of a server is unrealistic
since law enforcement will lack knowledge of the server’s location, and the
provider may move the data at any time. Second, data can be stored
anywhere; servers often exist across national boundaries and around the
world. 196 Third, data is often not stored in any one location. The common
practice of sharding involves splitting up data and distributing it among
multiple locations. 197
International law recognizes and addresses data location concerns.
The Convention on Cyber Crime, or Budapest Convention, mandates that
all signatory countries maintain the ability to use legal processes to compel
companies to produce electronic data they control, even when the company

193
194
195
196

Id.
Id.
See generally infra Section V.E.
See infra Section V.E.
Jeeyoung Kim, How Sharding

Works, MEDIUM (Dec. 5, 2014),
https://medium.com/@jeeyoungk/how-sharding-works-b4dec46b3f6
[https://perma.cc/T469-RRTR]. For an important analysis of forensic science concerns in
cloud computing ecosystems, see MARTIN HERMAN ET AL., NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS &
TECH., NIST CLOUD COMPUTING FORENSIC SCIENCE CHALLENGES (2020),
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir/2020/NIST.IR.8006.pdf
[https://perma.cc/JN3BMDYK].
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stores the data in another country. 198 The Department of Justice has noted
that the CLOUD Act “makes explicit in U.S. law the long-established U.S.
and international principle that a company subject to a country’s jurisdiction
can be required to produce data the company controls, regardless of where
it is stored at any point in time.” 199
Given the irrelevance of the data’s location, law enforcement must
identify the relevant internet-service provider(s) with access to the desired
evidence and immediately send a letter of preservation. The SCA mandates
that upon a governmental entity’s request, a provider “shall take all
necessary steps to preserve records and other evidence in its possession,”
pending further legal process. 200 This initial request is valid for ninety days
and may be extended for an additional ninety days. 201 Preserving data is a
critical tool to prevent destruction or loss of evidence while obtaining
additional legal authority. Investigators or prosecutors failing to take this step
unnecessarily compromise critical evidence in criminal cases, potentially by
a suspect’s overt acts, such as deleting content or accounts or using remote
wiping programs or signals, or automated actions of the service provider,
such as routine deletion processes. 202
After sending a letter of preservation, the appropriate method of
legal process must be selected. This analysis arguably differs depending on
whether the prosecutor’s approach is based on a strict textual analysis of the
SCA or a proactive recognition of the trajectory of Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence. The latter is required to avoid suppression of evidence 203 and
problematic case law, given the trend of privacy-oriented judicial opinions
and greater scrutiny of law enforcement’s reliance on traditional Fourth
Amendment doctrines. 204
For a strict textual analysis, guidance for legal process is found in
the SCA, 18 U.S.C. § 2701, et seq. Multiple methods of legal process are
set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 2703 depending on the circumstances. More
specifically, if the information sought is the contents of a wire or electronic
Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime art. 21, opened for signature Nov. 23, 2001,
C.E.T.S. No. 185 (entered into force Jan. 7, 2004). For an official list of participating
countries, see Chart of Signatures and Ratifications of Treaty 185: Convention on Cyber
Crime, COUNCIL OF EUROPE, https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list//conventions/treaty/185/signatures?p_auth=cmPs1otx [https://perma.cc/83D4-EQA8]; see
also THE PURPOSE AND IMPACT OF THE CLOUD ACT, supra note 36.
THE PURPOSE AND IMPACT OF THE CLOUD ACT, supra note 36.
18 U.S.C. § 2703(f)(1) (2018).
Id. § 2703(f)(2).
“A remote wipe generally refers to the deleting of data on a device . . . . During a remote
wipe, the deletion is triggered from a remote system endpoint.” Remote Wipe,
TECHOPEDIA,
https://www.techopedia.com/definition/10352/remote-wipe
[https://perma.cc/3WCJ-X7ZB].
See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2209–10 (2018).
See supra Section II.C.
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communication and has been in electronic storage for 180 days or less, §
2703(a) requires a search warrant pursuant to the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure or in “[s]tate court, issued using [s]tate warrant procedures . . .
.” 205 These search warrants must be issued “by a court of competent
jurisdiction,” whether state or federal. 206 The SCA defines this broadly as “a
court of general criminal jurisdiction of a [s]tate authorized by the law of that
[s]tate to issue search warrants . . . .” 207
If the information is the contents of a wire or electronic
communication, and it has resided in electronic storage for more than 180
days, § 2703(b) applies and permits a couple of options for legal process.
The first of these is a search warrant using the same procedures as those
listed in § 2703(a). The second option is by obtaining an administrative
subpoena 208 or a court order under § 2703(d). Any “court of competent
jurisdiction” 209 may issue 2703(d) orders. The thresholds for obtaining
subpoenas and 2703(d) orders are lower than probable cause; to obtain a
2703(d) order, law enforcement must offer “specific and articulable facts
showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe” that the information
sought is “relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation.” 210 This
lower standard has great significance, as demonstrated by the outcome and
analysis of the Supreme Court in Carpenter v. United States. 211
Notably, the SCA does not require notice to the account holder
when law enforcement uses legal process to access account content.
However, a specific provision of the SCA permits delaying the legal process
notification to the account holder if requested by law enforcement and
approved by a court issuing an order to delay the notification. 212 In light of
privacy-oriented judicial trajectories and the risk of evidence loss, law
enforcement officers should err on the side of caution and always include a
delay in notification application and court order authorizing delayed notice
to an account holder. A court may delay the notification for a period of
ninety days. 213 In ongoing investigations, law enforcement may request that
a court extend the notification delay in increments of additional ninety days
upon application and court order. 214

205
206
207

18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) (2018).

Id.
Id. § 2711(3)(B).

Administrative subpoenas must be “authorized by a [f]ederal or [s]tate statute or a [f]ederal
or [s]tate grand jury or trial subpoena.” Id. § 2703(b)(1)(B)(i).
Id. § 2703(d).
208

209
210
211
212
213
214

Id.

Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018).
18 U.S.C. § 2705 (2018).

Id.
Id.
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If law enforcement is seeking to obtain non-content records of
electronic communications, 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c) authorizes four methods:
“consent of the subscriber or customer,” subpoena, 2703(d) order, or
search warrant. 215 Non-content records may include the subscriber’s name;
address, telephonic session times and durations; length of service including
start dates and service types; telephone number and other subscriber
identifiers; and the means and payment sources for the account. 216 Obtaining
this information by subpoena often provides critical leads and corroboration
for law enforcement. Examples include establishing a suspect’s identity in
the early stages of investigation and obtaining information to satisfy the
probable cause threshold necessary for search warrants requesting
authorization to examine communication contents. Google’s subpoena
returns provide an excellent example of the information law enforcement
may uncover using a subpoena. Generally, the Google subpoena response
may include names, phone numbers, and email addresses associated with
the Google account; time and date of last logins; and specific IP addresses
used, among other information. Equally enlightening, the return also lists
any Google services used by that subscriber, such as Google Calendar,
Google Photos, and location history. Individually or collectively, the
subscribers’ Google services data could corroborate allegations or provide
specific Google products to target with a search warrant. 217
Even though multiple methods of obtaining content exist under §
2703(b), a search warrant is the most appropriate option. From a practical
standpoint, in many cases, investigators possessing specific and articulable
facts sufficient to meet § 2703(d)’s threshold are most likely able to meet
the probable cause threshold to secure a search warrant. For law
enforcement confronted with the choice of using either a § 2703(d) order
or a search warrant, a search warrant is the wiser option. Data secured
through a search warrant supported by probable cause flips the burden to a
defendant to demonstrate a basis for declaring the search warrant invalid
and suppressing the evidence.
The trajectory of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence illustrates the
wisdom of the maxim “When in doubt, get a search warrant,” 218 evidencing
greater sensitivity to privacy concerns, even in the context of long-established
215
216

Id. § 2703(c)(1).
Id. § 2703(c)(2).

Information represented by Google in August 2020. Google made these representations
during a workshop presented for the 2020 Crimes Against Children Conference. The
workshop itself is no longer accessible at cacconference.org, but the workshop was attended
by the author(s), and the information is consistent with the authors’ prosecutorial practice.
This is a critical practice pointer that unfortunately most prosecutors (and other attorneys)
are unaware of.
See supra Part II.
217
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and rarely-questioned doctrines. In several prior cases, the United States
Supreme Court “held repeatedly” information conveyed to a third party,
even if only for a “limited purpose” or in “confidence,” enjoyed no Fourth
Amendment protection. 219 The prior decisions ruled a person lacked a
reasonable “expectation of privacy in information voluntarily turned over to
third parties.” 220
As integration of technology in daily life became ubiquitous,
however, courts began to develop and apply heightened Fourth
Amendment protections. In Riley v. California, the Supreme Court
prohibited warrantless cell phone searches, “even when a cell phone is
seized incident to arrest.” 221 The Court reasoned that cell phones “are not
just another technological convenience. With all they contain and all they
may reveal, they hold for many Americans ‘the privacies of life.’” 222
The Carpenter Court applied a similar privacy-oriented analysis to
impose a new search warrant supported by probable cause threshold to
obtain cell site location information (CSLI). 223 In that case, law enforcement
used a § 2703(d) order to obtain CSLI data. 224 The Court specifically
rejected the third-party doctrine’s application to CSLI data, holding that the
context of CSLI being “gathered by a third party does not make it any less
deserving of Fourth Amendment protection.” 225 The Court concluded that
the use of the § 2703(d) order’s lower threshold of “specific and articulable
facts” failed to satisfy an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy in the
data. 226 Contradictory to the legal process provisions within the SCA,
especially § 2703(b), the decision eviscerates a court order’s effectiveness to
obtain transactional data.
The Sixth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Warshak 227
exemplifies the peril of relying on the SCA’s legal process provisions to
obtain communications content. In Warshak, law enforcement sent a letter
of preservation pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2703(f) and followed up with legal
process—specifically, an administrative subpoena as authorized by the text
of § 2703(b) for disclosure of emails over 180 days old. 228 Contrary to the
SCA’s procedural mandates, the Sixth Circuit found that a reasonable
expectation of privacy existed in the emails’ content obtained by law
United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976).
Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2209 (2018) (citing Miller, 425 U.S. at 435;
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979)).
Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 401 (2014).
Id. at 403 (citation omitted).
See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2209–10.
Id. at 2212.
Id. at 2223.
Id. at 2209, 2212.
631 F.3d 266 (6th Cir. 2010).
Id. at 283; see 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) (2018).
219
220

221
222
223
224
225
226
227
228
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enforcement and imposed a warrant requirement. 229 The Warshak court
ruled that the Fourth Amendment required law enforcement to procure a
search warrant authorizing the examination of the emails’ content. 230 The
court rejected the SCA’s delineation in § 2703(b) of legal process categories;
the length of email storage was irrelevant to the court’s analysis. 231 The
Warshak court determined law enforcement’s failure to use a search
warrant to access the email content violated the Fourth Amendment. 232
Additionally, the court found the relevant portion of the SCA was
unconstitutional. 233
When the remote computing service or electronic communications
service refuses to honor the issued legal process, the prosecutor should
zealously advocate for enforcing the subpoena, court order, or search
warrant. 234 As the chief law enforcement officer in the jurisdiction, a
prosecutor has a duty to investigate the basis for the legal objection, engage
in negotiations, and, where appropriate, secure the production of the
requested records through a motion to compel or order to show cause.
Whether a case resides in federal or state court, the judiciary
possesses the inherent authority to compel and sanction a party for
noncompliance with a lawfully served subpoena, court order, or search
warrant. The judiciary’s elemental power emanates from constitutional,
statutory, and court-developed rules—without which, a court would be
powerless over the attorneys or litigants who appear before the bench. A
subpoenaed party may seek relief from the judge when there is reason to
question a document’s validity or the authority to issue the subpoena. A
party failing to request judicial review usurps judicial authority, potentially
acting contemptuously. If this standard applies to subpoenas, then the same
reasoning retains even greater import when an ex parte modification to a
search warrant occurs. 235

229
230
231
232
233

Warshak, 631 F.3d at 286.
Id. at 288.
Id.
Id.
Id.

For instance, an ISP/ESP has no right to stand in the shoes of their customer and assert a
right of privacy in response to a validly issued warrant. See In re 381 Search Warrants to
Facebook, Inc., 78 N.E.3d 141, 143, 153 (N.Y. 2017). The ISP/ESP has a limited right to
review in a subpoena/court order. Id. at 147–49.
Service provider remedies are often limited in the context of search warrants. See id. at
145–49 (finding that an order denying Facebook’s motion to quash a search warrant was not
appealable).
234

235

1110

MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW

1.

[Vol. 47

Costs Associated with Obtaining the Data

In exchange for producing the data, a remote computing service or
electronic communications service may seek reimbursement for costs
“directly incurred in searching for, assembling, reproducing, or otherwise
providing such information.” 236 The amount of such reimbursement shall be
mutually agreed upon by the government and the remote computing service
and/or electronic communications service. 237 If the parties do not reach an
agreement, the court, where the legal process originated or where the
criminal action commences, shall decide the amount of reimbursement
owed. 238
Interestingly, 18 U.S.C. § 2706(c) exempts communications
common carriers from seeking cost reimbursement from law enforcement
for telephone toll records and telephone listings. 239 When Congress enacted
the Electronic Communications Privacy Act in 1986, Congress did not
intend to compensate service providers for the costs of routine requests for
subscriber and toll information. 240
Since the SCA’s passage in 1986, technology advanced from the
basic days of dial-up internet services Prodigy, CompuServe, and Juno to
Google and Yahoo. Likewise, the legal process for subscriber information,
internet protocol logs, and content increased. 241 With the growth of
technology, remote computing service, and electronic communication
service, providers have expanded legal compliance departments and
leveraged technology to access data for the consumer’s benefit as well as
accommodate the increase in legal process for subscriber information,
internet protocol logs, and content. 242 This increase in legal process is likely
attributable to the increased use of technology to commit a crime. Arguably,
the statutory intent in exempting common communications carriers from
seeking cost reimbursement from law enforcement for telephone toll
records and telephone listings may now apply for a majority of legal
236

18 U.S.C. § 2706(a) (2018) (emphasis added).

Id. § 2706(b).
Id.
Id. § 2706(c).
See Mich. Bell Tel. Co. v. Drug Enf’t Admin., 693 F. Supp. 542, 544 (E.D. Mich. 1988).
See,
e.g.,
Dropbox
Legal
Transparency
Report,
DROPBOX,
https://www.dropbox.com/transparency/reports [https://perma.cc/P58A-2ND9]; Google
Transparency
Report:
Requests
for
User
Information,
GOOGLE,
237
238
239
240
241

https://transparencyreport.google.com/user-data/overview [https://perma.cc/4HCW-7H55];
Verizon
Media
Government
Data
Requests,
VERIZON
MEDIA,
https://www.verizonmedia.com/transparency/reports/government-data-requests.html
[https://perma.cc/6EU7-Y2WB].
See, e.g., Dropbox Legal Transparency Report, supra note 243; Google Transparency
Report: Requests for User Information, supra note 243; Verizon Media Government Data
Requests, supra note 243.
242
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demands to remote computing service and electronic communication
service providers.
The plain wording of 18 U.S.C. § 2706 equally suggests that a
remote computing service or electronic communication service provider
cannot withhold data pending payment. 243 Indeed, 18 U.S.C. § 2706 states
that “a governmental entity . . . shall pay . . . a fee for reimbursement for
such costs . . . directly incurred in . . . providing such information.” 244 The
use of the past tense in the word incurred, coupled with the present tense
usage of the word reimbursement, 245 indicates that the records already have
been produced for a duly served piece of legal process.
What is more, the plain wording refers to expenses directly related
to the production. 246 Providers should not be permitted to obtain financial
benefits beyond the intent of 18 U.S.C. § 2706, and prosecutors or law
enforcement receiving an inordinate bill from a service provider should
avail themselves of the court of original jurisdiction to resolve the disputed
amount.
The following hypothetical illustrates the process of obtaining
remotely-stored data on servers within the United States. 247 John, a fortythree-year-old man residing in Midgard (the newest state admitted to the
United States), began texting with a fourteen-year-old female, Stacy, after
ending his relationship with Stacy’s mom. John sent Stacy explicit chats,
resulting in John asking Stacy to meet him for a sexual encounter. During
the in-person meeting, John committed several sex acts against Stacy, all of
which John recorded using his nPhone. In addition to John’s nPhone saving
pictures and videos directly to the phone, John configured his nPhone to
automatically save a duplicate of any photo or video created with the phone
to John’s nCloud account. nCloud is a cloud-based storage service owned
and operated by Nectarine. Nectarine is a company headquartered in
California, and Nectarine servers (which host the nCloud data) are in
Virginia. John, suspecting the police knew about his criminal acts with Stacy,
performed a factory reset of his nPhone, destroying all data (including chats
and photos) on his nPhone.
However, performing the factory reset did not remove the photos
or chats from John’s nCloud account, and John did not delete the data from
See H. MARSHALL JARRETT, MICHAEL W. BAILIE, ED HAGEN & NATHAN JUDISH,
SEARCHING AND SEIZING COMPUTERS AND OBTAINING ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE IN
CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS 127 (2009) (“Section 2703 offers five mechanisms that a
“government entity” can use to compel a provider to disclose certain kinds of information.”).
18 U.S.C. § 2706(a) (2018) (emphasis added).
“[T]he act of paying back money to someone who has spent it for you or lost it because of
you, or the amount that is paid back.” Reimbursement, CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY,
https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/reimbursement
[https://perma.cc/HT5S-WRD9].
18 U.S.C. § 2706(a) (2018).
See supra Part I.
243

244
245

246
247

1112

MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47

his nCloud account. Following Stacy’s disclosure to her guidance counselor,
the police learned of John’s manipulation and sexual assault. Officer Kay
Oss, of the Midgard State Police, responded to the guidance counselor’s
report and opened an investigation. Officer Oss wants to obtain the chats
and photos from John’s nCloud account. Officer Oss is uncertain what legal
process to use since the servers are in Virginia and not Midgard.

2.

How Should the Midgard Prosecutors Advise Officer Oss?

Officer Oss should immediately send a letter of preservation to
Nectarine. If Officer Oss is unsure where and how to send the preservation
letter, she could access an investigative resource such as search.org,
specifically SEARCH’s Internet Service Provider (ISP) List; ask her local
prosecutor; or ask a colleague on Listserv. Officer Oss could likely access
the company’s contact information, including email, phone, and address
information from the ISP List. The ISP List contains additional information
for contacting the appropriate personnel at Nectarine. The critical address
for serving legal process on a company providing communication services
is the location of the company’s corporate headquarters, not the physical
location of servers, which is typically unknown to law enforcement. Once
received by the company, the preservation letter secures the target data for
ninety days, with a possible extension of an additional ninety days. 248 Officer
Oss may now focus on drafting the appropriate legal process.
In the initial hypothetical, Officer Oss limits her data requests to
chats and photographs. Even so, she would be wise to take a much broader
view of the potential digital evidence available to her. For example, a
subpoena for non-content subscriber information may reveal other
Nectarine services John uses, IP addresses, sources of payment, different
phone numbers, or email addresses associated with the account. All this
information may lead to additional incriminating information, contraband,
and other potential corroboration. Nectarine may also retain location
information about John’s nPhone. Based on the Carpenter decision
rationale, caution mandates Officer Oss to use a search warrant to request
location data. The mere inclusion of slight location information is not
necessarily fatal to a subpoena or § 2703(d) order. Yet, the Carpenter Court
fired a cautionary flare by distinguishing traditional “business records that
might incidentally reveal location information” from the CSLI records in
Carpenter, which included the collection of thousands of data points with
location information. 249
For brevity’s sake, we will focus on the potential chats and
photographs. These data types constitute wire or electronic communication
content, so Officer Oss should follow the old mantra, “when in doubt, get a
248
249

18 U.S.C. § 2703(f)(2) (2018).
Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2220 (2018).
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search warrant.” Midgard’s state laws do not prohibit the issuance of SCA
warrants to out-of-state entities by one of Midgard’s many courts of
competent jurisdiction. While drafting the follow-up legal process to secure
account information, Officer Oss should also request delayed notice to the
subscriber regarding any request for data. While pursuing this data, Officer
Oss should consider statute of limitations issues and tolling options. 250

C.

Obtaining Internationally Stored Data via CLOUD Act Agreement

After her rousing success in the above hypothetical case, Officer
Oss transferred to an investigative position in Jotunheim, recently admitted
as the fifty-third state. Her first case involved Marv Springstein, who
downloaded and compiled an extensive collection of child sexual abuse
material. Springstein stored this material in an online cloud account
managed by LockBox, a United States corporation. Springstein was
extremely careful to avoid storing any information in his digital devices or
vehicles. Officer Oss immediately sent a preservation letter to LockBox and
followed up with a search warrant issued by a Jotunheim magistrate.
LockBox informed Officer Oss that all its servers are in the United
Kingdom, outside the United States’ jurisdiction.

1. Can Officer Oss Access This Information, and if So, How?

This fact pattern emerges from the circumstances presented in

United States v. Microsoft Corp., where the government sought an SCA
251

warrant to require Microsoft to produce all emails and information
associated with an account hosted by Microsoft. 252 The CLOUD Act
clarified that, subject to exceptions, if the requested data is in the possession
or control of a United States corporation, organization, or legal person, SCA
warrants must be honored, even if the data is stored overseas. 253
Clearly, Officer Kay Oss is on firm footing in obtaining this data
since the United Kingdom is the first nation to enter into a bilateral
agreement with the United States, as envisioned by the CLOUD Act. 254
Agreements are permissible “only to obtain information relating to . . .
See infra Section V.D.
See supra Section III.A.; United States v. Microsoft Corp., 138 S. Ct. 1186 (2018).
In re Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled and Maintained by
Microsoft Corporation, 829 F.3d 197 (2d Cir. 2016), vacated and remanded sub nom.
Microsoft Corp., 138 S. Ct. 1186.
See generally Clarifying Lawful Overseas Use of Data Act, H.R. 4943, 115th Cong. (2018)
250
251
252

253

(enacted),
https://www.justice.gov/dag/page/file/1152896/download
[https://perma.cc/KQH5-N9QT] [hereinafter CLOUD Act].

U.S. and UK Sign Landmark Cross-Border Data Access Agreement to Combat Criminals
and Terrorists Online, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (Oct. 3, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/us254

and-uk-sign-landmark-cross-border-data-access-agreement-combat-criminals-and-terrorists
[https://perma.cc/4B5G-FMSK].
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serious crime,” a term that is not defined by the CLOUD Act, aside from
noting that “terrorism” is included. 255 Fortunately, the United Kingdom
bilateral agreement defines “serious crime” as crime that carries “a
maximum sentence of at least three (3) years imprisonment.” 256 As in the
CLOUD Act, no specific crimes are listed aside from terrorism. 257
Springstein’s “extensive collection” of child sexual abuse material should
meet this threshold. While pursuing this data, Officer Oss should consider
statute of limitations issues and tolling options. 258
It should be noted that the CLOUD Act “supplements rather than
eliminates” MLATs, which remain “another method by which evidence”
may be made available. 259
One significant change created by the CLOUD Act involved
amending the SCA to enable service providers to move to modify or quash
SCA warrants. “Court[s] may modify or quash the legal process” 260 upon
request by providers, if the court determines: (1) that compliance with
process would violate the laws of a “qualifying foreign government;” 261 (2)
that modification or quashing is in the interests of justice based on the
totality of the circumstances; and (3) that the target of legal process is not a
United States person or resident. 262 The CLOUD Act also mandates an
eight-factor comity analysis in determining the interests of justice. 263
255
256
257
258

THE PURPOSE AND IMPACT OF THE CLOUD ACT, supra note 36, at 5.

See supra Part IV.
CLOUD Act, supra note 255, at 16.
See infra Section V.D.

THE PURPOSE AND IMPACT OF THE CLOUD ACT, supra note 36, at 11.
18 U.S.C. § 2703(h)(2)(B) (2018).
“Qualifying foreign government” is defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2703(h)(1)(A) (2018) as a
foreign government “with which the United States has an executive agreement that has
entered into force under” 18 U.S.C. § 2523 (2018). The foreign government must also
maintain laws “which provide to electronic communication service providers and remote
computing service providers substantive and procedural opportunities similar to those
provided” in 18 U.S.C. § 2703(h)(2) (2018) (“Motions to Quash or Modify”) and 18 U.S.C.
§ 2703(h)(5) (2018) (“Disclosure to Qualifying Foreign Governments”).
18 U.S.C. § 2703(h) (2018) (“Comity Analysis and Disclosure of Information Regarding
Legal Process Seeking Contents of Wire or Electronic Communication”).
Id. § 2703(h)(3)(A)–(H).
(A) the interests of the United States, including the investigative interests
of the governmental entity seeking to require the disclosure; (B) the
interests of the qualifying foreign government in preventing any
prohibited disclosure; (C) the likelihood, extent, and nature of penalties
to the provider or any employees of the provider as a result of
inconsistent legal requirements imposed on the provider; (D) the
location and nationality of the subscriber or customer whose
communications are being sought, if known, and the nature and extent
of the subscriber or customer’s connection to the United States, or if the
legal process has been sought on behalf of a foreign authority pursuant
to section 3512, the nature and extent of the subscriber or customer’s
259
260
261

262

263
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Prosecutors should consider the propriety of formal and informal
approaches to these conflict of law scenarios. 264

D. Obtaining Internationally Stored Data via Mutual Legal Assistance
Treaty (MLAT)
Officer Oss’s international investigative endeavors continued when
she arrested Marv Springstein’s brother, Mark Springstein, who also
maintained an extensive collection of child sexual abuse material.
Unfortunately, Mark Springstein stored his contraband material in a
FireBox account instead of LockBox. FireBox is incorporated in the
country of Muspelheim and does not have a bilateral agreement pursuant
to the CLOUD Act. Muspelheim maintains a mutual legal assistance treaty
(MLAT) with the United States.

1.

Can Officer Oss Access This Information in the Absence of a
CLOUD Act Agreement?

While Officer Oss is unable to utilize the streamlined CLOUD Act
process, she could use the MLAT process. As of 2017, sixty-five countries
had entered into MLAT agreements with the United States, and the
European Union joined an agreement with the United States establishing
mutual legal assistance (MLA) mechanisms with all European Union
member states. 265 If Officer Oss were uncertain whether the United States
had an MLAT with Muspelheim, she could work with her prosecutor to

connection to the foreign authority’s country; (E) the nature and extent
of the provider’s ties to and presence in the United States; (F) the
importance to the investigation of the information required to be
disclosed; (G) the likelihood of timely and effective access to the
information required to be disclosed through means that would cause
less serious negative consequences; and (H) if the legal process has been
sought on behalf of a foreign authority pursuant to section 3512, the
investigative interests of the foreign authority making the request for
assistance.

Id.
See THE PURPOSE AND IMPACT OF THE CLOUD ACT, supra note 36, at 11–16. Additional
264

options for prosecutors could include “narrowing or modifying a request to avoid the conflict;
resolving the conflict through closer inquiry or good-faith negotiation; or making the request
under an applicable MLAT.” Id. at 16.
Mark Rush & Jared Kephart, Lifting the Veil on the MLAT Process: A Guide to
Understanding and Responding to MLA Requests, K & L GATES (Jan. 20, 2017),
https://www.klgates.com/lifting-the-veil-on-the-mlat-process-a-guide-to-understanding-andresponding-to-mla-requests-01-20-2017/ [https://perma.cc/U4XS-QLRA].
265
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contact the Department of Justice’s Office of International Affairs (OIA) for
clarity. 266
The United States Attorney’s Manual provides guidance to Officer
Oss on the specific steps in submitting a treaty request. 267 Because each treaty
is negotiated by and with different parties, the treaties’ content varies greatly,
regardless of the subject matter. As a result, the United States Attorney’s
Manual explains that OIA will provide prosecutors with model requests
based on the specific jurisdiction. 268
Based on this model, prosecutors are encouraged to describe
“simply and clearly the facts of the case” and “nature of the assistance
requested” without using technical legal terms, such as “RICO or even
probable cause.” 269 Since most applications will be translated to local
languages, legal terms may or may not have local equivalencies, even if the
same legal concepts are utilized.
Prosecutors should then send this draft to OIA, which will either
finalize the request or return to the prosecutor for needed changes. The
“central authority” of all treaties currently in force is the Department of
Justice, which leads to the request being signed in the Department and not
by a judge. 270 Following signature, translation is arranged, and upon receipt
of translation, OIA transmits the MLAT request to the foreign “central
authority.” 271
Following receipt of the request, Muspelhiem will process the
request according to its pertinent domestic law and acquire the necessary
court authority to access Mark Springstein’s FireBox account. Assuming the
Muspelheim judicial system grants the order, then local Muspelheim
authorities acquire the resulting data and send it to Officer Oss. 272
The acquired evidence must still pass standard evidentiary
thresholds to be admissible in court. Prosecutors should also prospectively
consider attempting to toll the relevant statute of limitations when they
initiate legal process, given the long time frames often involved in locating
and receiving evidence from foreign countries. At the federal level,
See U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., JUSTICE MANUAL § 276 (2020),
https://www.justice.gov/archives/jm/criminal-resource-manual-276-treaty-requests
[https://perma.cc/CMT3-X5XZ].
Id.
A sample request is provided in the Appendix.
See U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., JUSTICE MANUAL § 281 (2020),
https://www.justice.gov/archives/jm/criminal-resource-manual-281-drafting-requestsassistance [https://perma.cc/WS5X-HJED]. “RICO” refers to the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organization Act (RICO). See Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No.
91-452, 84 Stat. 922; 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq.
See JUSTICE MANUAL § 276, supra note 268.
266

267
268
269

270
271
272

Id.
See THE PURPOSE AND IMPACT OF THE CLOUD ACT, supra note 36, at 3.
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prosecutors are empowered to file applications with district courts to
suspend the running of the statute of limitations. Applications are granted
when the court makes a finding, by a preponderance of the evidence, that
the government made an “official request” 273 to obtain foreign evidence, and
it “reasonably appears, or reasonably appeared” when the request was
made, that the evidence would be found in the foreign country. 274
Importantly, the suspension has limited duration. 275

E.

Obtaining Internationally Stored Data Without MLATs or CLOUD
Act Agreements

As Officer Oss’s career continued, she encountered a similar
scenario while investigating another distributor of child sexual abuse
material, Mike Springstein. Officer Oss’s investigation uncovered significant
evidence that Mike’s contraband material is stored on his cloud account
within the Icebox social media platform. Icebox is incorporated in
Niffelheim, a nation which does not have a CLOUD Act or MLAT
agreement with the United States. Prior negotiations over these specific
agreements have been unproductive due to diplomatic tension over
numerous human rights violations throughout Niffelheim.

1.

Does Officer Oss Have Any Legal Process Options in the
Absence of Both Agreements?

First, Officer Oss should consider that CLOUD Act and MLAT
agreements are not the only categories of relevant international agreements;
numerous interim executive agreements exist with several countries. 276
Accordingly, Officer Oss should contact the United States OIA to
determine what agreements and options may exist to determine optimal
instruments and approaches in this geopolitical context. 277

“As used in this section, the term ‘official request’ means a letter rogatory, a request under
a treaty or convention, or any other request for evidence made by a court of the United States
or an authority of the United States having criminal law enforcement responsibility, to a court
or other authority of a foreign country.” 18 U.S.C. § 3292(d) (2018).
Id. § 3292(a)(1).
Id. § 3292(c) (“The total of all periods of suspension under this section with respect to an
offense— (1) shall not exceed three years; and (2) shall not extend a period within which a
criminal case must be initiated for more than six months if all foreign authorities take final
action before such period would expire without regard to this section.”).
U.S.
DEP’T
OF
JUST.,
JUSTICE
MANUAL
§
277
(2020),
https://www.justice.gov/archives/jm/criminal-resource-manual-277-executive-agreementsand-memoranda-understanding-mutual-assistance [https://perma.cc/W8CK-RQB8].
273

274
275

276

277

Id.
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In all cases, prosecutors must first “determine the jurisdiction from
which assistance is needed.” 278 Since assistance from foreign jurisdictions
typically “depends on the existence of articulable facts,” indicating the
evidence’s presence within the foreign jurisdiction, prosecutors should be
prepared to state this information. 279
Officer Oss should not assume the complete absence of treaties or
executive agreements, but even in such a scenario, letters rogatory may
provide a solution. A letter rogatory is a request from a US judge to a foreign
country’s judiciary, requesting an act which “would constitute a violation of
that country’s sovereignty[]” 280 if performed without the foreign court’s
consent.
While letters rogatory are typically delivered through diplomatic
channels, a more efficient method is “by transmitting a copy of the request
through Interpol” or other direct route. 281 A rogatory letter’s form and
content varies depending on the recipient country; thus, prosecutors should
consult with the United States OIA throughout the drafting process. 282 The
United States Attorney’s Manual provides helpful procedural steps for
letters rogatory. 283 The Department of Justice estimates that the letters

U.S.
DEP’T
OF
JUST.,
JUSTICE
MANUAL
§
268
(2020),
https://www.justice.gov/archives/jm/criminal-resource-manual-268-location-evidence
[https://perma.cc/KJ9W-UJXJ].
278

279

Id.

U.S.
DEP’T
OF
JUST.,
JUSTICE
MANUAL
§
275
https://www.justice.gov/archives/jm/criminal-resource-manual-275-letters-rogatory
[https://perma.cc/AM26-MQ7P].
280

281
282

Id.
Id.

Id.
Id.
283

Letters rogatory generally include: (1) background (who is investigating
whom and for what charge); (2) the facts (enough information about the
case for the foreign judge to conclude that a crime has been committed
and to see the relevance of the evidence that is being sought); (3)
assistance requested (be specific but include an elastic clause to allow
subsequent expansion of the request without filing an additional letter
rogatory); (4) the text of the statutes alleged to have been violated; and
(5) a promise of reciprocity. Letters rogatory must be signed by a judge
and, normally, authenticated by (1) an apostille, (2) an exemplification
certificate, (3) a chain certificate of authentication, or (4) as directed by
OIA. If the requested state has ratified the Hague Convention
Abolishing the Requirement of Legalization of Foreign Public
Documents, it is preferable to use an apostille. The chain certification is
a cumbersome process involving authentication by the Department of
Justice, the Department of State, and the embassy of the foreign country
to which the letter rogatory is directed. Consult OIA to ascertain which
method to use because authentication requirements change frequently.

(2020),
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rogatory method of assistance can take a year or more, 284 so prosecutors
should strongly consider statute of limitations issues and tolling options in
this context. 285
Officer Oss could also attempt various “informal means” of
obtaining evidence from Niffelheim, though she should recognize that some
methods may not yield admissible evidence. 286 These could include asking
foreign authorities to open an investigation and share evidence; requesting
that foreign jurisdictions provide public records to United States law
enforcement; conducting “depositions of voluntary witnesses” 287 at United
States embassies and consulates; making treaty requests; using informal
requests between law enforcement agencies; and sending requests through
Interpol for evidence or information. 288
The Convention on Cybercrime, or “Budapest Convention,” is a
critical international agreement that has been ratified by sixty-five countries

First, obtain a model from OIA [Office of International Affairs] and
check with OIA to ascertain the requirements of the particular country.
Second, prepare a draft . . . and send it to OIA for clearance. Third,
secure a judge’s signature. Submit the cleared final to the district court
in two originals under cover of an application for issuance of letters
rogatory and a memorandum in support, models of which have been
obtained from OIA. One signed original letter rogatory remains with the
court. Fourth, authenticate as directed by OIA. Unless OIA has
instructed you differently, affix an apostille or other authentication to the
signed duplicate original and send it and two copies to OIA. Fifth, make
arrangements for translation . . . and send the duplicate original with
translation to OIA, which will transmit it to the Department of State, the
American Embassy in the country concerned, or directly to the
appropriate ministry or authority in the country concerned. If OIA
transmits the letter rogatory with translation via the diplomatic channel,
the Embassy will send it to the Foreign Ministry under cover of a
diplomatic note, the Foreign Ministry will usually refer it to the Ministry
of Justice, and the Ministry of Justice will usually forward it to the proper
judicial authority where it will be executed. Normally, the evidence, once
obtained, is returned through the same channel by which the request
was transmitted. In some cases, the request is sent to an attorney in the
foreign jurisdiction who is retained to present the request, obtain the
evidence, and deliver it to the United States.

Id.
Id.
See supra Section V.D.
284
285
286

U.S.
DEP’T
OF
JUST.,
JUSTICE
MANUAL
§
274
https://www.justice.gov/archives/jm/criminal-resource-manual-274-methods
[https://perma.cc/YFS5-GXZ5].
U.S.
DEP’T
OF
JUST.,
JUSTICE
MANUAL
§
278
https://www.justice.gov/archives/jm/criminal-resource-manual-278-informal-means
[https://perma.cc/A78T-CH6R].
Id. (referencing current known locations or suspect photographs).

(2020),

287

(2020),

288
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as of April 2020. 289 The prolific adoption of the Budapest Convention is
cause for optimism by Officer Oss, particularly if Niffelheim is a signatory,
since all parties are required to adopt domestic law “under which relevant
authorities can compel providers in their territory to disclose electronic data
in their possession or control.” 290 Even so, the Budapest Convention does
not include an exception for “data that a company controls but chooses to
store abroad.” 291

F.

Legal Implications of Extraterrestrial Data Storage

Data storage—and even the provision of internet service itself—is
increasingly explored in the context of satellites. For example, SpaceX has
launched over 700 StarLink satellites and obtained approval for 12,000
satellites. 292 This phenomenon is so prevalent; optical and radio astronomers
are concerned because of satellites’ obstruction of telescopes. 293
Several private entities have entered the industry of space-based
data storage. 294 SpaceBelt describes itself as a “Cloud Constellation
Corporation” that is “leading the cloud transformation of space.” 295
SpaceBelt offers increases in data security and convenience as selling
points. 296 Some companies anticipate energy benefits because solar radiation

Convention on Cybercrime, Council of Europe, Nov. 23, 2001, E.T.S. No. 185,
https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?docume
ntId=0900001680081561 [https://perma.cc/CL23-Z238]. The official list of party countries
is
available
at
https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list//conventions/treaty/185/signatures?p_auth=cmPs1otx [https://perma.cc/7PS5-8AKB].
THE PURPOSE AND IMPACT OF THE CLOUD ACT, supra note 36, at 7; see Convention on
Cybercrime, supra note 291, at 9 (mandating each signatory to “adopt such legislative and
other measures as may be necessary to empower its competent authorities to order . . . a
person in its territory to submit specified computer data in that person’s possession or
control, which is stored in a computer system or a computer-data storage medium”).
THE PURPOSE AND IMPACT OF THE CLOUD ACT, supra note 36, at 7.
Daniel Clery, Starlink Already Threatens Optical Astronomy. Now, Radio Astronomers
Are
Worried,
SCI.
(Oct.
9,
2020,
2:25
PM),
https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2020/10/starlink-already-threatens-optical-astronomynow-radio-astronomers-are-worried [https://perma.cc/8ULK-NUBH].
289

290

291
292

293
294

Id.
See generally Yevgeniy Sverdlik, Space: The Ultimate Network Edge, DATACENTER

KNOWLEDGE
(Oct.
17,
2016),
https://www.datacenterknowledge.com/archives/2016/10/17/space-the-ultimate-networkedge
[https://perma.cc/5QY7-82WW];
SPACEBELT,
http://spacebelt.com/#about
[https://perma.cc/TX2F-K5LX];
CONNECTX,
https://connectx.com/
[https://perma.cc/E9TA-U2QT].
SPACEBELT, supra note 296.
295
296

Id.
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could power servers at a minimal cost. 297 Space itself may provide practical
advantages for data storage since “the cold of space could allow faster
processing without the risk of overheating.” 298 Some predict significant cost
savings given the proliferation of terrestrial data centers, 299 the economic
costs of cybersecurity maintenance and breaches of terrestrial
infrastructure, 300 and the decreasing costs of launching satellites into orbit. 301
Extraterrestrial data storage also provides context for additional
innovation in data delivery. For example, machine learning models can
predict the best routes for data transmission:
If you are located in Emeryville, California . . . and it’s a
cloudy day in the Bay Area, the system will not send the
signal [from space] directly to Emeryville. Instead, it may
drop it down further south, say in Sacramento, where the
sky is clear and from where the data will be routed along
terrestrial fiber to its intended recipient[.] 302
Returning to the hypothetical, let us assume that Officer Oss
opens an investigation of Joe Collector, an eccentric, independently wealthy
billionaire who maintains various exotic flora and fauna in an increasingly
crowded menagerie. Aside from discovering numerous Endangered
Species Act violations, Officer Oss developed probable cause to believe that
Joe stores another collection of illegal images and videos on a satellite
currently in Earth’s orbit. At the time Officer Oss sought a search warrant,
the satellite was in orbit directly above the sovereign nation of Paradise
Archipelago. Infinity Dust, Inc. launched and maintained the satellite,
which is based in Midgard, the nation where Oss currently serves as a law
enforcement officer. When Officer Oss arrested Joe, he was not overly
concerned. Instead, Joe bragged about how he stores the data in outer
space—safely beyond the jurisdiction of any terrestrial government.

Rick Delgado, Cloud Computing Is Moving to Outer Space?, SMARTDATA COLLECTIVE
(June 21, 2016), https://www.smartdatacollective.com/cloud-computing-moving-outer-space/
[https://perma.cc/LEK9-YVZD].
297

298

Id.

Dan Matthews, Data Storage in Space? It’s Already in the Works, SMARTDATA
COLLECTIVE (Apr. 2, 2018), https://www.smartdatacollective.com/data-storage-space-works/
[https://perma.cc/Q3VR-75JX].
Michael Sheetz, Satellite Start-Up Raises $100 Million to Put Cloud Data Storage in Space,
CNBC (Dec. 20, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/12/19/cloud-constellation-raises-100million-to-store-cloud-data-in-space.html [https://perma.cc/4WZL-Z9NL].
Delgado, supra note 299.
Sverdlik, supra note 296.
299

300

301
302
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Can Officer Oss Access Joe Collector’s Data, Despite its Location
in Outer Space?

This hypothetical provides an additional illustration of the
importance of focusing on the physical location of the corporation
maintaining the data, as opposed to the actual physical location of the
targeted data. 303 The satellite’s orbital location above Paradise Archipelago
is irrelevant since the servers’ location—terrestrial or extraterrestrial—is not
the dispositive consideration for legal process. Rather, Officer Oss should
direct her attention to the corporation maintaining the relevant data, which
is in Midgard. An immediate preservation letter should be sent, followed by
a search warrant.
Extraterrestrial data storage implications may receive judicial
attention in the near future. While the hypothetical based on extraterrestrial
data storage seems inconceivable, a few entities already marketed
extraterrestrial data storage to conceal data from governmental actors. For
example, one extraterrestrial data storage corporation advertises that “‘no
one can physically access our [satellite] system and no government or entity
can force the exposure of your information.’” 304 Asgardia—a company based
out of Vienna, Austria—styles itself as the first space-based nation. It
possesses its own calendar, constitution, parliament, national symbols, and,
as of November 2017, its own satellite with data storage capabilities, seeking
to store data “beyond the reach of Earthly laws.” 305 While it is beyond this
Article’s scope to explore international law issues presented by these
arguments, 306 numerous pertinent international law sources and oversight
have existed since the birth of space exploration. 307

303
304

See supra Section V.B.
Andrew Donoghue, The Idea of Data Centers in Space Just Got a Little Less Crazy,

DATACENTER KNOWLEDGE (Feb. 9, 2018), https://www.datacenterknowledge.com/edgecomputing/idea-data-centers-space-just-got-little-less-crazy [https://perma.cc/Y9HJ-JDHR].
Mark Harris, The First Space-Based ‘Nation’ Wants to Store Data Off-Planet, Beyond the
Law, VICE (June 6, 2017), https://www.vice.com/en/article/a3zveg/asgardia-nation-spacedata-storage-off-planet [https://perma.cc/BKS5-39GW]. Asgardia purports to be a nongovernmental organization based in Vienna, Austria. ASGARDIA THE SPACE NATION,
https://asgardia.space/en/page/imprint [https://perma.cc/H7HG-UQJ2].
Convention on Cybercrime, supra note 291.
See Yun Zhao, Space Commercialization and the Development of Space Law, OXFORD
RSCH.
ENCYC.
PLANETARY
SCI.
(July
30,
2018),
https://oxfordre.com/planetaryscience/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190647926.001.0001/ac
refore-9780190647926-e-42 [https://perma.cc/X2PC-M9ZJ].
305

306
307
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APPENDIX 308

A. Long-Arm Statutes 309
Alabama:
ALA. R. CIV. P. 4.2 (Westlaw through Nov. 20, 2020); Butler v. Beer Across
America, 83 F. Supp. 2d 1261 (N.D. Ala. 2000); Keelean v. Cent. Bank of
the South, 544 So. 2d 153 (Ala. 1989), overruled by Prof’l Ins. Corp. v.
Sutherland, 700 So. 2d 347 (Ala. 1997)).
Alaska:
ALASKA STAT. § 09.05.015 (West, Westlaw through Chapter 32 and Ballot
Measure 2 of the 2020 Second Reg. Sess. of the 31st Leg.); Kennecorp
Mortg. & Equities, Inc. v. First Nat’l Bank of Fairbanks, 685 P.2d 1232 (Ala.
1984).
Arizona:
ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 4.2 (Westlaw through Jan. 1, 2021); Aries v. Palmer
Johnson, Inc., 735 P.2d 1373 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987); Meyers v. Hamilton
Corp., 693 P.2d 904 (Ariz. 1985).
Arkansas:
ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-4-101 (West, Westlaw through Dec. 15, 2020);
Pennsalt Chem. Corp. v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 426 S.W.2d 417 (Ark.
1968); Smith v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 968 F. Supp. 1356 (W.D. Ark.
1997).
California:
CAL. CODE CIV. P. § 410.10 (West, Westlaw through Chapter 13 of 2021
Reg. Sess); Abbott Power Corp. v. Overhead Elec. Co., 131 Cal. Rptr. 508
(Cal. Ct. App. 1976); Pavlovich v. Superior Court, 58 P.3d 2 (Cal. 2002).
Colorado:
COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-1-124 (West, Westlaw through Mar. 16, 2021);
Waterval v. District Court In & For El Paso County, 620 P.2d 5 (Colo.
1980).
Connecticut:
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-59b (West, Westlaw through Mar. 4, 2021); Gates
v. Royal Palace Hotel, 23 Conn. L. Rptr. 670 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 30,
1998); Standard Tallow Corp. v. Jowdy, 459 A.2d 503 (Conn. 1983).
Numerous templates for prosecutors, law enforcement officers, and allied professionals
are available on the National White-Collar Crime Center (NW3C) and Zero Abuse Project
websites. See NW3C, INC., nw3c.org [https://perma.cc/TH7X-4XZZ], and ZERO ABUSE
PROJECT, zeroabuseproject.org [https://perma.cc/5JNY-E5EX] for more information. These
templates include sample letters of preservation, search warrants and related affidavits, and
MLAT requests, among other resources.
See Long-Arm Statutes: A Fifty-State Survey, VEDDER PRICE (2003),
http://euro.ecom.cmu.edu/program/law/08-732/Jurisdiction/LongArmSurvey.pdf
[https://perma.cc/JWR7-RWHK].
308

309

1124

MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47

Delaware:
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 3104 (West, Westlaw through Chapter 7 of the
151st Gen. Assemb. (2021-2022)); Eudaily v. Harmon, 420 A.2d 1175 (Del.
1980); Kane v. Coffman, No. 00C-08-236, 2001 WL 914016 (Del. Super.
Ct. 2001).
District of Columbia (D.C.):
D.C. CODE § 13-423 (West, Westlaw through Feb. 3, 2021); Env’t Rsch.
Int’l, Inc. v. Lockwood Greene Eng’rs, Inc., 355 A.2d 808 (D.C. 1975);
GTE New Media Servs., Inc. v. Ameritech Corp., 44 F. Supp. 2d 313
(D.D.C. 1999).
Florida:
FLA. STAT. § 48.193 (West, Westlaw through the 2020 Second Reg. Sess.
of the 26th Leg.); Homeway Furniture Co. of Mount Airy, Inc. v. Horne,
822 So. 2d 533 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
Georgia:
GA. CODE ANN. § 9-10-91 (2003) (West, Westlaw through 2021, Act 4);
Beasley v. Beasley, 396 S.E.2d 222 (Ga. 1990).
Hawaii:
HAW. REV. STAT. § 634-35 (West, Westlaw through Act 1 of the 2021 Reg.
Sess.); Cowan v. First Ins. Co. of Hawaii, LTD., 608 P.2d 394 (Haw. 1980).
Idaho:
IDAHO CODE § 5-514 (West, Westlaw through Jan. 11, 2021); Schneider
v. Sverdsten Logging Co., 657 P.2d 1078 (Idaho 1983).
Illinois:
735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-209 (Westlaw through P.A. 101-655); Aero
Products Int’l, Inc. v. Intex Corp., No. 02 C 2590, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
17948 (N.D. Ill. 2002); Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Mosele, 368 N.E.2d
88 (Ill. 1977).
Indiana:
IND. R. TRIAL P. 4.4 (Westlaw through Jan. 15, 2021); Anthem Ins. Cos.
v. Tenent Healthcare Corp., 730 N.E.2d 1227 (Ind. 2000);
Communications Depot, Inc. v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., No. IP01-1587C-H/K, 2002 WL 1800044 (S.D. Ind. 2002); Search Force, Inc. v.
Dataforce Int’l, Inc., 112 F. Supp. 2d 771 (S.D. Ind. 2000).
Iowa:
IOWA CODE § 617.3 (West, Westlaw through Mar. 8, 2021); Universal
Coops., Inc. v. Tasco, Inc., 300 N.W.2d 139 (Iowa 1981).
Kansas:
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-36, 210 (West, Westlaw through 2021 Reg. Sess.);
D.J.’s Rock Creek Marina, Inc. v. Imperial Foam & Insulation Mfg. Co.,
No. 01-4139-JAR, 2003 WL 262495 (D. Kan. 2003); Woodring v. Hall,
438 P.2d 135 (Kan. 1968).
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Kentucky:
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 454.210 (West, Westlaw through Chapter 60 of the
2021 Reg. Sess.); Auto Channel, Inc. v. Speedvision Network, LLC, 995 F.
Supp. 761 (W.D. Ky. 1997); Tube Turns Div. of Chemtron Corp. v.
Patterson Co., 562 S.W.2d 99 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978).
Louisiana:
LA STAT. ANN. § 13:320 (Westlaw through 2020 Second Extraordinary
Sess.); Mid City Bowling Lanes & Sports Palace, Inc. v. Ivercrest, Inc., 35
F. Supp. 2d 507 (E.D. La. 1999); Petrol. Helicopters, Inc. v. AVCO Corp.,
513 So. 2d 1188 (La. 1987).
Maine:
ME. STAT. tit. 14, § 704-A (Westlaw through the 2019 Second Reg. Sess.
of the 129th Leg.); Talarico v. Marathon Shoe Co., No. CIV 00-239-P-C,
2001 WL 366346 (D. Me. 2001); Tyson v. Whitaker & Son, Inc., 407 A.2d
1 (Me. 1979).
Maryland:
MD. CODE ANN., COURTS & JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS § 6-103 (West,
Westlaw through Mar. 14, 2021); A. F. Briggs Co. v. Starrett Corp., 329
A.2d 177 (Me. 1974); ALS Scan, Inc. v. Wilkins, 142 F. Supp. 2d 703 (D.
Md. 2001).
Massachusetts:
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 223A, § 3 (West, Westlaw through February 15,
2021); Back Bay Farm, LLC v. Collucio, 230 F. Supp. 2d 176 (D. Mass.
2002); Tatro v. Manor Care, Inc., 625 N.E.2d 549 (Mass. 1994).
Michigan:
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.705 (West, Westlaw through P.A.2021, No. 3,
of the 2021 Reg. Sess.); Green v. Wilson, 565 N.W.2d 813 (Mich. 1997);
Siebellink v. Cyclone Airsports, Ltd., No. 1:01-CV-591, 2001 WL 1910560
(W.D. Mich. 2001); Sifers v. Horen, 188 N.W.2d 623 (Mich. 1971); Sports
Auth. Michigan, Inc. v. Justballs, Inc., 97 F. Supp. 2d 806 (E.D. Mich.
2000).
Minnesota:
MINN. STAT. § 543.19 (2003); State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Tennessee
Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., 646 N.W.2d 169 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002); State by
Humphrey v. Granite Gate Resorts, Inc., 568 N.W.2d 715 (Minn. Ct. App.
1997).
Mississippi:
MISS. CODE ANN. § 13-3-57 (West, Westlaw through Mar. 16, 2021);
Internet Doorway, Inc. v. Parks, 138 F. Supp. 2d 773 (S.D. Miss. 2001);
Mladinich v. Kohn, 164 So. 2d 785 (Miss. 1964).
Missouri:
MO. REV. STAT. § 506.500 (West, Westlaw through the end of the 2020
Second Reg. Sess. and First and Second Extraordinary Sess. of the 100th
Gen. Assemb.); State ex rel. Deere & Co. v. Pinnell, 454 S.W.2d 889 (Mo.
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1970); State ex rel. Nixon v. Beer Nuts, Ltd., 29 S.W.3d 828 (Mo. Ct. App.
2000).
Montana:
MONT. R. CIV. P. 4B (Westlaw through Feb. 18, 2021); Bedrejo v. Triple
E Canada, Ltd., 984 P.2d 739 (Mont. 1999); Simmons v. State, 670 P.2d
1372 (Mont. 1983).
Nebraska:
NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-536 (West, Westlaw through Mar. 18, 2021); Stucky
v. Stucky, 185 N.W.2d 656 (Neb. 1971); Wagner v. Unicord Corp., 526
N.W.2d 74 (Neb. 1995).
Nevada:
NEV. REV. STAT. § 14.065 (West, Westlaw Chapter 3 of the 81st Reg.
Sess.); Certain-Teed Prod. Corp. v. Second Judicial District Court, 479 P.2d
781 (Nev. 1971); Graziose v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 161 F. Supp. 2d
1149 (D. Nev. 2001); Trump v. Eighth Judicial District Court (Becker), 857
P.2d 740 (Nev. 1993).
New Hampshire:
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 510:4 (Westlaw through 2020 Reg. Sess. of the
Gen. Ct.); Estabrook v. Wetmore, 529 A.2d 956 (N.H. 1987); Phelps v.
Kingston, 536 A.2d 740 (N.H. 1987); Metcalf v. Lawson, 802 A.2d 1221
(N.H. 2002); Remsbury v. Docusearch, Inc., No. CIV. 00-211-B, 2002 WL
130952 (D.N.H. Jan. 31, 2002).
New Jersey:
N.J. CT. R. R. 4:4–4 (Westlaw through Feb. 1, 2021); Avdel Corp. v.
Mecure, 277 A.2d 207 (N.J. 1971); Gendler & Co. v. Telecom Equip.
Corp., 508 A.2d 1127 (N.J. 1986); Ragonese v. Rosenfeld, 722 A.2d 991
(N.J. Super. Ct. 1998).
New Mexico:
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-1-16 (West, Westlaw through Chapter 6 of the 1st
Reg. Sess. of the 55th Leg.); Origins Nat. Res., Inc. v. Kotler, 133 F. Supp.
2d 1232 (D.N.M. 2001); Telephonic, Inc. v. Rosenblum, 543 P.2d 825
(N.M. 1975); Windward v. Holly Creek Mills, Inc., 493 P.2d 954 (N.M.
1972).
New York:
N.Y. C.P.L.R. 302 (McKinney, Westlaw through L.2021, Chapters 1 to 49,
61 to 80); Armouth Int’l, Inc. v. Haband Co., 715 N.Y.S.2d 438 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2000); Longines-Wittnauer Watch Co. v. Barnes & Reinecke, Inc., 209
N.E.2d 68 (N.Y. 1965).
North Carolina:
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-75.4 (Westlaw through the end of the 2020 Reg. Sess.
of the Gen. Assemb.); Dillon v. Numismatic Funding Corp., 231 S.E.2d
629 (N.C. 1977); Replacements, Ltd. v. MidweSterling, 515 S.E.2d 46 (N.C.
Ct. App. 1999).
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North Dakota:
N.D. R. Civ. P. 4 (Westlaw through January 15, 2021); Hebron Brick Co.
v. Robinson Brick & Tile Co., 234 N.W.2d 250 (N.D. 1975).
Ohio:
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.382 (West, Westlaw through Files 1 to 115
of the 133rd Gen. Assemb.); CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257
(6th Cir. 1996); U.S. Sprint Commc’ns Co. P’ship v. Mr. K’s Foods, Inc.,
624 N.E.2d 1048 (Ohio 1994).
Oklahoma:
OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2004 (West, Westlaw through Chapter 2 of the First
Reg. Sess. of the 58th Leg.); Hough v. Leonard, 867 P.2d 438 (Okla. 1993);
Intercon, Inc. v. Bell Atl. Internet Sols., Inc., 205 F.3d 1244 (10th Cir.
2000).
Oregon:
OR. R. Civ. P. 4 (Westlaw through Mar. 3, 2020); State, ex rel. Hydraulic
Servocontrols Corp. v. Dale, 657 P.2d 211 (Or. 1982); Tech Heads, Inc. v.
Desktop Serv. Ctr., Inc., 105 F. Supp. 2d 1142 (D. Or. 2000).
Pennsylvania:
42 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5322 (West, Westlaw through
2021 Reg. Sess. Act 9); Kenny v. Alexson Equip. Co., 432 A.2d 974 (Pa.
1981); Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D.
Pa. 1997).
Puerto Rico:
P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 32A, § III, R. 4.7 (2019); Pou v. Am. Motors Corp.,
127 P.R. Dec. 810 (P.R. 1991).
Rhode Island:
9 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-5-33 (West, Westlaw through Jan. 7, 2020); Conn v.
ITT Aetna Fin. Co., 252 A.2d 184 (R.I. 1969).
South Carolina:
S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-803 (Westlaw through 2021 Act No. 7); Sheppard
v. Jacksonville Marine Supply, Inc., 877 F. Supp. 260 (D.S.C. 1995).
South Dakota:
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 15-7-2 (Westlaw through Mar. 22, 2021); Ventling
v. Kraft, 161 N.W.2d 29 (S.D. 1968).
Tennessee:
TENN. CODE ANN. § 20-2-214 (West, Westlaw through Feb. 3, 2021);
Bailey v. Turbine Design, Inc., F. Supp. 2d 790 (W.D. Tenn. 2000);
Masada Inv. Corp. v. Allen, 697 S.W.2d 332 (Tenn. 1985).
Texas:
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 17.042 (West, Westlaw through
end of the 2019 Reg. Sess. of the 86th Leg.); Riviera Operating Corp. v.
Dawson, 29 S.W.3d 905 (Tex. Civ. App. 2000); U-Anchor Advert., Inc. v.
Burt, 553 S.W.2d 760 (Tex. 1977).
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Utah:
UTAH CODE ANN. 1953 § 78-27-24, renumbered as § 78B-3-205 (West
through 2020 6th Spec. Sess.); Brown v. Carnes Corp., 611 P.2d 378 (Utah
1980); iAccess, Inc. v. WEBcard Techs., Inc., 182 F. Supp. 2d 1183 (D.
Utah 2002).
Vermont:
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 855, 913 (West, Westlaw through Acts 1 through
4 of the Reg. Sess. of the 2021–2022 Vt. Gen. Assemb.); Bard Bldg. Supply
Co. v. United Foam Corp., 400 A.2d 1023 (Vt. 1979); O’Brien v. Comstock
Foods, Inc., 194 A.2d 568 (Vt. 1963).
Virginia:
VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-328.1 (West, Westlaw through the End of 2021
Reg. Sess.); Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane S.p.A. v. Casinoalitalia.Com, 128
F. Supp. 2d 340 (E.D. Va. 2001); Carmichael v. Snyder, 164 S.E.2d 703
(Va. 1968); Verizon Online Servs., Inc. v. Ralsky, 203 F. Supp. 2d 601 (E.D.
Va. 2002).
Washington:
WASH. REV. CODE § 4.28.185 (West, Westlaw through Chapter 8 of the
2021 Reg. Sess. of the Wash. Leg.); Precision Lab. Plastics v. Micro Test,
Inc., 981 P.2d 454 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999); Tyee Constr. Co. v. Dulien Steel
Prods., Inc., of Washington, 381 P.2d 245 (Wash. 1963).
West Virginia:
W. VA. CODE § 56-3-33 (West, Westlaw through Mar. 16, 2021); Abbott
v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 444 S.E.2d 285 (W.Va. 1994).
Wisconsin:
WIS. STAT. § 801.05 (West, Westlaw through Apr. 18, 2020); PKWare,
Inc. v. Timothy L. Meade, 79 F. Supp. 2d 1007 (E.D. Wis. 2000); Zerbel
v. H.L. Federman & Co., 179 N.W.2d 872 (Wis. 1970).
Wyoming:
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 5-1-107 (West, Westlaw through Chapters 1–3 of the
2020 Spec. Sess. of the Wyo. Leg.); First Wyoming Bank, N.A., Rawlins v.
Trans Mountain Sales & Leasing, Inc., 602 P.2d 1219 (Wyo. 1979).

